

JPRS-WER-84-015

9 February 1984

# West Europe Report

**FBIS**

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

9 February 1984

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

## CONTENTS

## TERRORISM

## IRELAND

- IRA Chief of General Staff Discusses Harrod's Bombing  
(Sorj Chalandon; LIBERATION, 29 Dec 83) ..... 1
- Harrod's Bombing Complicates British, Irish, IRA Relations  
(LIBERATION, 29 Dec 83) ..... 5

## POLITICAL

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- German Press Notes French 'European Defense' Proposals  
(FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, VORWAERTS, 8 Dec 83) ..... 11
- Rejected by Centrist Daily, by Robert Held  
SPD Organ Skeptical, by Michael Stuehrenberg

## FINLAND

- Communists Increasingly Split as Congress Date Approaches  
(Jan-Anders Ekstrom; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 11 Jan 84) ..... 12
- Radio Reporter Firing Highlights 'Self-Censorship' Policy  
(DAGENS NYHETER, 16 Jan 84) ..... 14

## FRANCE

- Grosser on Defeat of 1940  
(Alfred Grosser Interview; DER SPIEGEL, 28 Nov 83) ..... 16

## NORWAY

- Foreign Minister on NATO Ties, EC, Barents Sea Talks  
(AFTENPOSTEN, 27 Dec 83) ..... 26

Conservative Party Voters Disillusioned With Coalition (Hakan Hagwall; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 3 Jan 84) .....	29
--	----

#### PORTUGAL

Political Future of Finance, Planning Minister Lopes Discussed (Joao Carreira Bom; EXPRESSO, 24 Dec 83) .....	32
--	----

#### TURKEY

Turkish 'Democracy', Cypriot 'Independence' Called Shams (Cemile Cakmak; ISCININ SESI, 21 Nov 83) .....	36
--	----

Draft Text of TCP's 'Fourth Program' (ISCININ SESI, 21 Nov 83) .....	39
---	----

### ECONOMIC

#### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Shortened Work Week Claimed To Enhance Employment (Rolf-Dietrich Schwartz; FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 21 Dec 83) .....	87
---	----

Early Retirement Bill Seen as Alternative to 35-Hour Week (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 21 Dec 83) .....	88
--	----

DGB Threatened With Split Over 35-Hour Work Week (Hugo Mueller-Vogg; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 2 Jan 84) ...	90
---	----

#### NORWAY

Industry Confederation Worried About Drop in Factory Output (Truls Martinsen; AFTENPOSTEN, 21 Dec 83) .....	93
--	----

### ENERGY

#### NORWAY

Statoil Presents Plans for Developing Gullfaks Field (Bjørn H. Tretvoll; AFTENPOSTEN, 21 Dec 83) .....	95
---	----

Director of Statoil Urges Retaining Firm's Role, Structure (Bjørn H. Tretvoll; AFTENPOSTEN, 23 Dec 83) .....	97
---	----

Oil Directorate Plans First Seismic Tests Around Jan Mayen (AFTENPOSTEN, 4 Jan 84) .....	103
---	-----

### OCEAN/POLAR ISSUES

#### NORWAY

Soviets Continue To Delay Barents Sea Settlement (Kjell Dragnes; AFTENPOSTEN, 20 Dec 83) .....	104
---	-----



## IRA CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF DISCUSSES HARROD'S BOMBING

Paris LIBERATION in French 29 Dec 83 p 20

[Interview with IRA chief of general staff by Sorj Chalandon, somewhere in Ireland; date not given]

[Text] Our special correspondent was able to meet, somewhere in Ireland, with the IRA general staff chief, who reaffirmed that the perpetrators of the attack on the London department store had not acted on his orders. He vigorously asserted that such "operations" would not occur again.

It takes time to meet with an official spokesman for the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Especially after a military operation as confusingly conducted and fraught with claims as was the bomb deposited last Saturday, 17 December, in front of Harrod's Department Store right in the heart of London. Few people in the IRA can discuss the incident. It cannot be ascribed to a Northern Irish active service unit, nor to a local battalion, not even to an urban or rural brigade, and only the IRA general staff is qualified to answer questions. After 4 days of patience, the time it takes to consult with underground agents, surrounding himself with the usual precautions, the chief of the IRA general staff (General Headquarters) agreed to answer LIBERATION's questions on Christmas Eve somewhere in Ireland.

LIBERATION [L]: Can you in a few words define the role of the IRA general staff?

General Headquarters [GHQ]: Our role consists of applying the policy and military directives formulated by the Army Council and of making them effective in the field. We furthermore see to it that our units have everything they need; we provide them with arms, ammunition, various kinds of equipment, the training of the men, and take care of the distribution of the training camps, the financing of the units, the education of our volunteers (editor's note: IRA soldiers) and propaganda within the army.

L: Are you in a position to keep tabs on every operation conducted by the IRA units, in Northern Ireland as well as elsewhere?

GHQ: Absolutely. We check on every operation engaged in by our volunteers, but sometimes we run up against more or less serious logistic problems in the

course of these operations, general problems of communication between the unit and the command. It's mainly these problems that sometimes turn a military operation into a very bad one, in a way the general staff did not want it to turn out to be. Then we have to resume contact with the unit, find other means of communication and again supervise the operations. Quite obviously, this kind of problem arises in a more critical way with our units operating outside of Ireland. I imagine somewhat like the problems British units that were isolated, voluntarily or not, had to face in occupied France during World War II.

L: In terms of your strategy, is opening fire on a British patrol in a Derry neighborhood ascribable to the same military principle as depositing a bomb in front of a big London department store on a Saturday?

GHQ: No, it's not the same thing. In Northern Ireland any unit whatsoever knows that it has complete freedom to kill British soldiers, Ulster Defense Regiment\* militiamen or the men of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (police of Northern Ireland). These operations fall completely within the scope decided on by the Republican Army Council. In Great Britain authorized targets are very carefully selected and it has been decided not to hit any "economic target" where civilians could be endangered. To give you an example, some time before the Harrod's bombing our volunteers bombed the British base at Woolwich last 10 December, wounding four soldiers.

L: At the time an organization calling itself the Scottish Liberation Front claimed responsibility for that attack. That wasn't true. Do you confirm the fact that the IRA was responsible?

GHQ: Absolutely. That attack was made by one of our units and this type of action has received our support. Every IRA operation directed against a British military target in England receives our automatic authorization.

L: Not Harrod's?

GHQ: The unit that operated at Harrod's — and we said so in our official communique — acted without authorization. That is, outside the scope of actions authorized by us. They were given no order.

L: Can you explain to us what happened and why your men exceeded their command's orders?

GHQ: It's still too soon to say. The investigation is in progress and it will be concluded, but the initial findings indicate that the unit planned the attack on its own initiative, persuaded that the target they had chosen was a perfectly acceptable and prestigious "economic target."

---

\* British regiment in Northern Ireland composed of over 90 percent loyalist Protestants.

L: Are you sure you're not shielding anyone else? Are you absolutely certain that it was really IRA volunteers who placed the bomb?

GHQ: Yes.

L: In the IRA I suppose that acting without orders is an extremely serious act as far as the movement's general discipline is concerned. Are you going to take steps against this unit?

GHQ: The Army Council is in the process of rendering a decision on the matter. As for me, I suggest that sanctions in fact be imposed, whether they be against the whole unit or against the IRA officer who was in charge of the unit.

L: What sort of sanctions?

GHQ: Nonphysical. They will be determined after the results of the investigation and could involve anything from a reduction in rank for the officer to suspension from his duties in the army to permanent banishment from the army.

L: Many people see in the Harrod's incident the spectacular expression of a difference of opinion. A difference of opinion between the unit and its higher command, the unit and the new political direction of the Sinn Fein or even between the IRA and the Sinn Fein. What do you think of this?

GHQ: To respond in advance to the problem implied by your question, I assert that there is no difference of opinion between the IRA and the Sinn Fein. There is no division in the army and nor risk of division. The operation against Harrod's — and you'll receive confirmation of this — is ascribable to a purely logistic and technical error. We don't want to excuse the unit responsible for it, but you do at any rate remember that it gave the British a 40-minute warning and that they didn't take advantage of that time to evacuate the street. The policy followed by the Republican Movement and known by the watchword: "a ballot in one hand and a rifle in the other," is accepted by IRA volunteers as the right policy to follow.

L: Nevertheless, you are running a big political risk when you assure us, as you have done in your communique, that this type of military action will not occur again in Great Britain. How can you be absolutely certain?

GHQ: We have resumed contact with the unit that was responsible and informed them that this kind of attack must not occur again. It won't happen again.

L: You're positive?

GHQ: Absolutely.\*

---

\* An unofficial IRA source in Belfast has indicated that the bomb that wounded two people on Oxford Street in London last 25 December was not set by any IRA unit.

L: Does this specifically mean that there will be no bombings of economic targets in Great Britain?

GHQ: Not a single one. Only IRA operations directed against military targets will be carried out. Woolwich will obviously be repeated, Harrod's won't. In Northern Ireland, on the other hand, operations of a commercial nature will continue, as is the case at present, preceded as usual by a warning far enough in advance to avoid any loss of civilian life in the population of Northern Ireland.

11,466

CSO: 3519/158

## HARROD'S BOMBING COMPLICATES BRITISH, IRISH, IRA RELATIONS

Paris LIBERATION in French 29 Dec 83 pp 20,21

[Article: "Irish Anger Against British Anger"]

[Text] The virulent reactions of the British press and government have forced many Belfast Catholics, embarrassed by the attack on Harrod's, to regret the fact that the IRA is dissociating itself from its own men.

About noon on 17 December 1983 a car parked opposite Harrod's Department Store in London quietly pulled out of its spot to leave it to a small blue Austin. Apparently, the first car was holding the spot for the second one. Registered in Great Britain with license plate number KFP252K, the Austin 1300 GT parked in front of the store, its driver opened the door and got lost in the crowd. The neighborhood was redolent of Christmas. Their arms filled with gifts, Londoners elbowed their way through a crowded passage between the street and the sidewalk to the sound of the traditional brass of the Salvation Army and the bells of the charity organizations calling for contributions. The IRA unit had just warned the humanitarian organization, the "Samaritans," by telephone. Their bomb was to explode in 40 minutes at Harrod's. Familiar with the procedure, in Northern Ireland a big store like Marks and Spencer was calmly evacuated in 30 minutes and all the surrounding streets cleared as a matter of course, but in London the problem is quite different.

For several days, with Christmas approaching, anonymous phone calls kept pouring into police stations. Assuming an Irish accent, men took pleasure in promising bullets and bombs at all hours of the day and night. One of them, a London official of noble ancestry, was to be sentenced to 3 months in prison for entering a false alarm.

The Samaritans warned the police, but the latter must assume responsibility for not evacuating the entire street and not calling on the targeted store to evacuate. Harrod's own management was to speak very frankly of a "loss of profit" in the event of a cessation of sales. When the bomb exploded, the street was full of people and the store overflowing with customers. The police recorded 5 dead, 2 of them policemen, and some 91 wounded, while a third policeman was to die a week later as a result of his wounds. In Great Britain anger was unleashed against those who placed the bomb. In Northern Ireland another sort of anger, just as savage, is running through the nationalist ghettos.



"They have interrupted television and radio broadcasts, they have produced special programs, Thatcher has gone to visit the wounded and the press has made the front pages speaking of 'demoniacal bastards.' The IRA action was stupid and it has put a lot of Republicans into an awkward position, but the English hysteria is such that I today refuse to condemn the unit that pulled off the job." Divis Flats, Belfast. A complex of rundown tenements opening on gray courtyards, apartments with window panes often replaced by cardboard or sheets of plywood, a kingdom of corrugated iron, of vengeful graffiti, of children's cries, of sinister stairways, of some 10 people crammed into two rooms. A fierce Republican bastion on Falls Road, Divis Flats is divided following the attack on Harrod's, like the family of Rose, an old girlfriend who received me in her little living room whose walls were bespangled with Christmas cards.

"This puts us in a very complicated position. We spend our time saying that we don't want a dirty war. Harrod's was a dirty business. Just as much so as when the British kill one of our children on the street or when a loyalist commando kills a Catholic." Sitting on the arm of a chair, Rose's daughter nodded. "The unit that made this attack acted without orders. The IRA said so and even apologized for it. Do the English apologize when they use plastic bullets to kill kids? Did they apologize when they arrested eight of their soldiers who had murdered Catholics when they were off duty?" Rose's brother Sammy came into the room. "The unit shouldn't have done that, but the IRA shouldn't have issued this communique. It should have admitted its responsibility for the action and settled its differences in private. We would all have accepted the collective responsibility for this bombing. Everyone knows that the IRA doesn't kill civilians on purpose and that's enough for us. We shouldn't hang our dirty wash out in public like that. To hell with world opinion. The world didn't raise a finger when 10 of our lads died during a hunger strike."

Two days after the attack Northern Ireland was talking of nothing but Harrod's. In the same terms, chastened or overflowing with images, but this time the Catholics did not have the feeling of shock that followed the February 1978 attack on the La Mon restaurant in Northern Ireland. A bomb that exploded prematurely killed 12 civilians seated at table who were celebrating a dog show. This time the incident occurred in England and, however terrible this attack may have been, the great majority of the population feels that it is the IRA's duty to take a maximum of precautions in Northern Ireland; too bad if lesser precautions are taken in England.

Irish anger has more to do with the embarrassing way in which the IRA "refused to accept responsibility" for its unit than with the action itself. "What kind of image are we presenting to the outside world? The image of a divided movement." The speaker was a member of the Sinn Fein who, like so many others, went so far as to defend the error committed at Harrod's to counter the reaction of the British. "Since this communique was issued, London maintains that there is a division inside the IRA or the Sinn Fein. They say that there are units that have gone astray, that do anything at all, that act without orders or on impulse. That's not true. It was an accident and they should have taken it as such. Merely an incident in a war." Incident. The word was repeated on the front page of the Republican weekly, REPUBLICAN NEWS, which in

its year's-end edition spoke of the "distortion and exaggeration of an isolated incident" before very quickly returning to the English press' extremely harsh reactions expressed in very plain terms. When the newspapers speak of "the holocaust" or the "cold barbarians," there is not a Catholic who can help but take these expressions as being directed against himself. "The IRA," Belfast Catholics repeat among themselves today, "is our army and we have to defend it."

A Sinn Fein rank-and-file meeting in West Belfast. "The communique is a bad one. It has been interpreted as an apology. The IRA ought never to apologize."

The only way to take Catholic Ireland's pulse is to go from door to door, go into the ghettos, walk through the narrow streets, drink dozens of cups of coffee and hundreds of cups of tea with one's back to the smoking fireplace. The locals finally come in, then more of them, those who live on the surrounding streets, and then they engage in strange discussions, repeated and heard a thousand times over. "Even the pope has condemned Harrod's. Why is he meddling in this affair? He's never mentioned our dead." "So they want to excommunicate the IRA? We won't attend mass any more. We'll have to do without an intermediary." A young man entered the room. "Harrod's? Merry Christmas. They can go to hell." A man asked him to be quiet because I was there, but no one protested.

Aside from Secretary of State for Northern Ireland James Prior, for a more or less long time now the class of politicians as a whole has been hoping that the Sinn Fein would be banned. Not only would such a measure be ineffective — the IRA has been banned since 1974 and that has not changed things much — but it would not resolve any of the problems posed by a party that musters 43 percent of the Northern Irish Catholic vote and has locally elected officials in Ireland, in the north, representatives in the Advisory Assembly of the Six Counties and even an abstaining member of Parliament at Westminster, Gerry Adams, the president of the Sinn Fein.

"A split inside the movement? No, nothing to fear on that account." With pipe in mouth and barraged by phone calls and unexpected visits, Adams received me in a house in Belfast. "There are apparently contradictions within the movement, contradictions between the existence of the armed struggle the IRA is waging and the demand for an electoral policy developed by the Sinn Fein. Just as there are contradictions in all aspects of Irish life, in a country divided into two parts. But an attitude that it is just as essential for the Sinn Fein to adopt is that it recognize the IRA's right to engage in the armed struggle in the six counties of Northern Ireland." Gerry Adams refused to condemn the attack on Harrod's because "the British don't condemn their murders" and thus refused to directly challenge the IRA, but he feels that this action was completely erroneous. "From our point of view, what happened at Harrod's was an error. We won't justify any IRA operation involving civilian casualties. The anger is great in England and that's very understandable. But it's just as great in Ireland when they shoot down unarmed Catholics to frighten the nationalist community. We aren't saying to the world and to our friends: 'Support the Harrod's incident, not even support the IRA or the Sinn Fein, rather simply support the Irish people's right to independence and sovereignty.'"



Like all the people we met, beyond the sometimes angelic words and sentences, Adams persists in vigorously denying any rumor of a serious disagreement inside his party. At the time of the last party congress (Ard Fheis), the leadership of the Sinn Fein left Ireland to pass into his hands, the hands of the man who lives on Falls Road. Following this change, former Republicans have resigned from their duties, sometimes prestigious men and women like Ruary O'Bradaigh, Kathleen Knowles or Daithi O'Connell. They themselves absolutely refuse to talk of a split, preferring the carefully selected term, "disagreement." Disagreement on the election strategy of the Sinn Fein, which will have to convene before the European Community if the Republicans are elected, disagreement also over the party's old federalist conception and disagreement above all over the more and more socialist tendency that is pervading the Sinn Fein, perfectly implemented by the departure of old nationalists whom certain northern members do not hesitate to describe as "conservatives."

Distributed "among the rank and file" in accordance with their own wishes, the party's "southerners" furthermore feel that its leadership is not representative of the real Irish situation since it is unequally composed of five "northerners" and only three residents from the 26 counties of Ireland. In the end it is obvious that these political and tactical differences will have an important effect on the future of the Republican party but, playing the democratic game, the "southerners" today feel that they have simply been put into the position of a minority in the party without for that reason either leaving it, condemning it or challenging its fundamental principles.

On Christmas Day conversations kept coming round to Harrod's. A few simple examples of a long and terrible business. In the Republican ghetto of Short Strand the "green cross" collected one and a half times as much as it did last year when passing the hat from door to door for the Republican prisoners. On the morning of 25 December hundreds of families invaded the cemetery of Milltown to lay wreaths on private graves and those of IRA volunteers killed during military actions. On Christmas Eve in Ireland small businessmen in Ballinamore refused to sell food to some 2,500 Irish policemen and soldiers engaged in a gigantic manhunt to find the IRA commando responsible for kidnapping British businessman Don Tidey and the deaths of two Irish members of the security forces. In the woods, in the village, in the courtyards of houses, young Irishmen chanted to the tune of "Button, Button, Who's Got the Button?" at the soldiers and policemen who were interrogating them on suspicious comings and goings: "Provo's here, Provo's there, Provo's every fucking where."

All the same, everyone now knows, after the assurance the IRA high command has given, that there will be no recurrence of an incident like Harrod's, that the smallest bomb placed by a Republican unit in England against a civilian objective will immediately be interpreted as a manifestation of a serious difference between the unit, or even part of the IRA, and its command. If that were to happen, a new communique by the IRA admitting that its men were acting without authorization would neither reassure nor satisfy anyone.

11,466  
CSO: 3519/158

## GERMAN PRESS NOTES FRENCH 'EUROPEAN DEFENSE' PROPOSALS

Rejected by Centrist Daily

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 8 Dec 83 p 1

[Article by Robert Held: "We Have No Use for That"]

[Text] Since the time when, during a visit to the Rhine, Chirac posed the question as to how the Federal Republic might be involved in European nuclear defense, it has at least become clear, despite immediate misunderstandings, that some thought is being devoted to this in France. Though imagination has no bounds, hasty conclusions should be avoided. While it may be presumed that in the long run no nation will tolerate nuclear weapons on its soil without having a say about them, in the case of the Federal Republic it is, for a start, much more important to insure that a solid majority is convinced that defense is necessary and is possible only in concert with our alliance partners. Too many minds are already haunted by the notion of unilateral defenselessness as the neatest trick of history. These days we have heard the fashionable French philosopher Glucksmann express the following thought: If this kind of pacifist ideology should win out and free Europe should disarm unilaterally, the Soviets would be bound to feel encircled by that new ideology and to feel compelled to bring the phenomenon under control--that is, occupy the relevant neighboring territory.

This speculation is not all that farfetched. It can be traced to the realization that we continue to be under the constraint of nuclear deterrence because the Soviet Union's preponderance in traditional weaponry is too great and because the West cannot achieve conventional deterrence since it lacks the funds for the relevant armament but also, in several countries, the desire for compulsory military service.

France and Britain will persist in their own nuclear deterrent and increase it many times over. This does not rule out the possibility of their nuclear weapons being integrated in the next big global nuclear balance (though not by being counted against the SS-20's). Both countries are determined not merely to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella but to keep an adequate deterrent of their own. Back of this is a cool look into the future concerning what the thinking of the U.S. nation might be, not least with a view to international developments in the United States in which social classes indifferent to Europe and also foreign political interests detached from Europe gain ground.

In France therefore, at least among the opposition, some thought is being devoted to the question as to how it might be possible also in the nuclear field to include the Germans in the planning of a "European" defense. If one has witnessed half a century of German-French relations, one is at first profoundly impressed by the fact that there are now such symptoms of a common destiny. But caution is called for concerning anything further--because the foundation is lopsided. Contrary to the ideal of civilization governed by international law, the world since the invention of the atom bomb has been divided into classes. There is an upper class, the superpowers, which would have preferred to be alone, and the three other nuclear powers. The rest of the states are have-nots.

The fact that this division of the world is barbaric is apparent from the fact that any country rising to the status of nuclear armament thereby gains a respectable place in the direction of this world order--like an old trooper of a robber baron rising to the ranks of high aristocracy. This is an absurdity and one day will be demolished as such by events. At present, though, this inequality is unavoidable, and there is hardly any reason for hoping that some good will result from its being demolished in the future. In the nonproliferation treaty, the Federal Republic once more pledged itself to this solution. Our status in this world order also separates us from France and Britain. In this field the partnership would remain unequal: to include only our financial and industrial power is unacceptable. The Federal Republic does not want to be a nuclear power. Nor--at least for now--should it even press for nuclear co-determination (such as a so-called second key to the U.S. weapons). This results in a certain dissociation from the French deliberations. But it will not be able in the next few decades to keep out of the general and friendly-neighborly rethinking which will result from an inevitable change.

Thus the division of labor remains. The Germans are providing most of the conventional deterrent, and it would be desirable for the allies to do more in that field. On the other hand, since the U.S. guarantee will become more unclear rather than more clear in the future, the Germans will listen to the French deliberations with benevolent interest but will also look kindly on the British and French deterrent power becoming more solid. This despite the fact that, of all times, this means a new rapprochement on the 80th anniversary of the Entente Cordiale between the two neighboring countries, which even contains a certain suspicion vis-a-vis German reliability. Better information about the nuclear planning of the two European nuclear powers is certainly desirable. A substantive association, however, is possible only in the conventional field--and is also worth striving for, as in the case of the combat helicopter. As for the nuclear shield of our existence, however, U.S. power must remain responsible for it.

## SPD Organ Skeptical

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 8 Dec 83 p 4

[Article by Michael Stuehrenberg on European security: "A Policy of Master in One's Own House"]

[Text] French Defense Minister Charles Hernu last week called for greater military cooperation among the European partners. The Europeans, the Socialist said, will have to engage in joint production of the coming generation of traditional weapons. As a good example, Hernu cited the German-French agreement concerning the construction of a combat helicopter. The minister made his statement at the meeting of the West European Union, [WEU], an organization Paris did not take seriously for a long time either.

What accounts now for France's vivid interest in the WEU and the advantages of European cooperation in the armament sector? Primarily probably the desire to detach the old continent gradually from its dependence on the United States.

While saying that Washington's military protection would still be needed "for a long time," Hernu stressed the fact that Europe must be "master of its own security." In Paris's view, nuclear weapons only serve the purpose of deterrence, which means that they will not be used. There again great importance is attached to traditional weapons.

Mitterrand has already ordered the establishment of a "rapid deployment force" in Europe. In the case of hostilities, it is to give the final warning against a big strategic nuclear strike. Its credibility rests on the independent "force de frappe" back of it, and in Europe only France has such a force. What is it then that Paris is actually proposing?

8790

CSO: 3620/126

## COMMUNISTS INCREASINGLY SPLIT AS CONGRESS DATE APPROACHES

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 11 Jan 84 p 4

[Article by Jan-Anders Ekstrom]

[Text] Helsinki--The former chairman of the Finnish Communist Party, Aarne Saarinen, who is still a member of the party's Politburo, warned in an interview with HELSINGIN SANOMAT against the way in which his successor, Jouko Kajanoja, is trying to restore party unity.

"It is an attempt to unite the party on the minority's terms," he said.

The minority, which is sometimes still described as Stalinist, is trying to get the upper hand by making use of Kajanoja and his supporters within the old majority group, according to Saarinen. If things continue this way, it will lead to membership defections and reduced financial support.

"Experience shows that if the minority gets more power, the party's dependence on the Soviet CP will also increase," said Saarinen, who regarded this as a worrying development.

Kajanoja's line is in complete conformity with the concept held by the Soviet brother party concerning how to restore order among Finland's communists. The idea is to create a new majority of those who are prepared to cooperate on the basis of the "right principles." In practice this means rejecting "extremist elements" on both the left and the right within the party, i. e. the most "class-oriented" group within the minority and the militant "hatchet line" within the majority.

In practice, Kajanoja's efforts have already led to a few questions in the Politburo. A new majority has emerged consisting of the minority and Kajanoja's own group within the majority. A similar constellation appears to exist within the People's Democratic-Communist group in parliament. The picture also includes a tendency to formulate decisions that make different interpretations possible.



Aarne Saarinen seems sure this is something the broad ranks of the party will not support. A clear indication of how they feel about Kajanoja's policy will come first in May when the party meets for its next congress.

One sign that Kajanoja's line may not have any broad support among the party's rank and file is that his big attempt to eliminate the "newspaper problem" has run into stiff resistance. The plan is based on ending the present situation with "two publics" by issuing a new party organ. The minority's paper, TIEDONANTAJA, will be merged after the party congress with the Central Committee's new paper, YHTEISTYO (Cooperation), which is now starting to come out on a regular basis. However, it has been very difficult for the new paper to get subscribers--so far it has only around 3,000--the editor in chief resigned before publication really got started and the management has had a very hard time finding willing and suitable editors. Nor are there any signs that the minority is ready to turn its back on TIEDONANTAJA, which is published by the minority's party district and is therefore not under the control of the Central Committee.

Aarne Saarinen is not pleased with the new paper and said bluntly that he would not lift a finger for it if TIEDONANTAJA continued publication. He also doubts that there is any real possibility of reconciling the opinions within the party.

"No such solution is in sight," he said.

For this reason Saarinen is now recommending a return to decisions made along the old and clear lines.

"Cruddy compromises are not satisfactory. Lack of clarity and bad agreements are no good. It is better to have a clear and unified majority that dictates decisions," he said in the interview with HELSINGIN SANOMAT.

His statements have already been interpreted as being the starting shot in the decisive power struggle at the party congress in May.

In addition to Saarinen, the general secretary of the party, Arvo Aalto, has also recently made statements in conflict with Kajanoja's efforts to achieve unity. He has said that the People's Democrats-Communists should try to gain re-entry into the government after the municipal elections. Not unexpectedly, this has been met with sharply negative comments from the minority group.

6578

CSO: 3650/99

## RADIO REPORTER FIRING HIGHLIGHTS 'SELF-CENSORSHIP' POLICY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Jan 84 p 15

[Text] Stockholm, 15 Jan (TT)--A Finnish reporter was fired by Radio Finland because he did not obey an order from radio management to stop a program on censorship in Finland. The program was broadcast over Radio Finland's English-language overseas program on 27 December after the reporter had revised the manuscript twice on instructions from his superiors.

On Thursday, Finnish journalist Patrick Humphreys, who is English-born but now a citizen of Finland, was fired. A letter from the radio management stated that on 27 December 1983 he "deliberately ignored instructions from the company." His employment was terminated with 2 months' notice.

The radio management did not say directly that the program on censorship was the reason for his dismissal; no reason was given in the dismissal notice except the "deliberate ignoring of instructions." However the date given for the "deliberate disobedience" coincides with the day the program was broadcast.

"One of my bosses asked to see the manuscript for the program. He suggested certain changes which I agreed to make. The manuscript then went to two other bosses who indicated that the changes were inadequate. I revised the manuscript one more time, but the changes were still considered insufficient."

Humphreys then decided to broadcast the program, which he did on 27 December.

It was 14 minutes long and dealt with censorship in Finland. He noted that there is no official censorship, but mentioned the whole problem of so-called self-censorship. The program contained a report on the Finnish press and also gave historic examples of attempts by those in power to control the mass media.

At the end of the week TT was unable to get hold of any of the Radio Finland chiefs involved in order to get their comments.



Patrick Humphreys would not speculate about which elements in the program could have displeased his superiors and led to his dismissal.

Just before the dismissal, Humphreys was asked to give the radio management a written explanation of why he had aired the program.

6578

CSO: 3650/99

## GROSSER ON DEFEAT OF 1940

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 28 Nov 83 pp 154-165

[Interview with Alfred Grosser in Paris on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Franco-German Treaty by editors Klaus-Peter Schmid and Dieter Wild; date not specified]

[Text] Alfred Grosser is regarded as the best interpreter of France to the Germans and of Germany to the French. Born in Frankfurt/M as the son of a Jewish professor of medicine, Grosser in 1933 emigrated to France with his parents, attended the Gymnasium [high school] in Saint-Germain-en-Laye near Paris and already in 1948 was general secretary of a "French Committee for Exchange With the New Germany". As director at the "Fondation nationale des sciences politiques" [National Foundation of Political Sciences] in Paris as well as political columnist of LE MONDE and other great French newspapers, Grosser, 58, accompanied German-French reconciliation through scientific and journalistic writings. In 1975 he received the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade--according to the document, as "mediator between the French and the Germans, the unbelievers and the believers, the Europeans and the people of other continents".

SPIEGEL: Mr Grosser, 1983 was the anniversary year of the Franco-German Treaty, whose 20-year existence was the subject of elaborate celebrations in Germany and in France. In our opinion, this treaty is no longer worth the paper it is written on. Do you agree?

GROSSER: No. Much more has happened than could have been expected. Valéry and Helmut one, Helmut one and François, François and Helmut two: Regardless of the name of the pair, the privileged cooperation continues.

SPIEGEL: Apart from the consultations of those who govern in Paris and Bonn, there is an entirely new phenomenon in the relations between the two peoples: The largest mass movement in the Germany of the postwar period, the peace movement, meets in France with mistrust and rejection. Once again one hears sounds which one believed had long been forgotten: The naive, unpredictable Teutons, the "people from the forests with their gnomes," it is said, are here again. How is so much lack of understanding to be explained?

GROSSER: There is not really that much lack of understanding. You are citing there the FIGARO-MAGAZINE. Those are our Straussians, they continue an old anti-German tradition of the French Right. What, on the other hand, the moderate French Left, for example, criticizes in regard to the present situation in the Federal Republic corresponds to the concerns of the last Helmut-Schmidt-faithfuls in the SPD.

SPIEGEL: But there is, after all, simply no appreciation for the peace movement in the Federal Republic in France.

GROSSER: Well, it is difficult to understand that in the Federal Republic, which was so excessively pro-American, suddenly so many people constantly express pity for the poor, scared Soviet Union, something which does not happen in France, where the communists have a share in the government.

SPIEGEL: But moderate French Leftists like Alfred Grosser, after all, complained for decades about the fact that the Federal Republic is too conformist, too meek with respect to the state, and too hostile to the communists. Now that the Germans behave completely differently it does not suit the French either. To many Germans this appears to be a bit hypocritical, not to say perverse.

GROSSER: No. First of all, the conformist, fellow-traveller-type of thinking today is sooner to be found among "those moved by peace", as well as the new intolerance. Secondly, the call no longer to recognize the legitimacy of the democratically-generated government decisions is something different from the courage of one's convictions vis-à-vis an authoritarian government.

SPIEGEL: That forces proceeding from the social basis become politically active and call into question the legitimacy of those who govern was, after all, always recognized and popular in France, wasn't it?

GROSSER: Here the state has been continuously criticized, but the legitimacy of the elected governments has almost always been recognized. In the Federal Republic, on the other hand, people today act as if there existed a democratic legitimacy which identifies itself solely by the number of demonstrators in the street.

SPIEGEL: But the French fears reach into fantastic zones. The German expert Jean-Paul Picaper, in his book "On the Road to the Fourth Reich" has even sketched a picture of the phantom of a national-Bolshevik Germany coming into being on France's eastern border. What do you think about that?

GROSSER: A campaign of slander. But it is true that two things are today being forgotten in the Federal Republic: How the Soviet Empire in Europe came into being in 1945/1948, and how the detente came into being thanks to the sober refusal to give in to the threats of the Soviet Union. In particular in 1955: The entrance of the Federal Republic into NATO did not result in the realization of Soviet threats, but in the Austrian State Treaty, the summit in

Geneva, and Adenauer's trip to Moscow.

SPIEGEL: In France people assert that the peace movement in Germany is breeding a neutral nationalism or neutral pacifism. But it is precisely the French who should have an appreciation for a more intense pursuit of national interests. Or do they not have it as soon as Germans are involved?

GROSSER: Is it perhaps not in the German national interest to remain free? If confronted with the choice between the reunification of Germany under Soviet domination or the continuation of the partition with the chance of improving the relations between the two German states, the overwhelming majority of Germans, after all, would make an unequivocal decision. However, I also always say that abroad the right to self-determination of the Germans is taken much less seriously than the right to self-determination of any African state. But today there are also many Germans who anymore speak of law and freedom in the GDR and Poland only in very subdued fashion.

SPIEGEL: Under Soviet domination, of course, the Germans do not want a reunification. But perhaps Moscow would permit an in-between form, a confederation of the two German states possibly, demilitarized and neutralized. But such ideas would, of course, meet with the determined protest of our French friends.

GROSSER: First of all, the Russians would never pursue anything like this seriously. The GDR is the jewel of their European empire. Personally, I would also regard a "neutral" zone in Central Europe as an enormous danger of war.

SPIEGEL: How is that?

GROSSER: Since 1945 peace in Europe has been guaranteed by the fact that the two great powers have physical contact with one another here. In short, there are no uncertainties. Otherwise we would have an African situation, in which both desire to infiltrate each other, and no one knows where something like this will end. The presence of American soldiers in Berlin is today the best peace guarantee which we have in Europe.

SPIEGEL: But there is a growing number of Germans who believe that the American peace guarantee can be replaced by a European or also by a French guarantee. There has never been an offer to this effect by France. Do you regard such an alternative as realistic?

GROSSER: No. There cannot be a European security system. Either it is not European, or it does not create security. It is nobody's fault, but no one can help it that the Soviet Union is at the same time a world power and is located in Europe. If the second world power, which is not located in Europe, would take off and disappear, we would be dominated by the Soviet Union, without the latter having to make any threat at all. But unfortunately with the United States it is no longer a European security system, but a subdivision of Soviet-American relations.

SPIEGEL: And if the Federal Republic would receive a voice in nuclear policy decisions, no matter how constituted?

GROSSER: The Federal Republic is not a nuclear power, does not want participation in nuclear policy decisions, but suffers from the fact that it does not have such participation. The only way out of this contradiction would be that there would not be any nuclear weapons on German soil at all. That would be a flight from the reality of nuclear deterrence.

SPIEGEL: This reality in the meantime appears to many Germans to be very dangerous.

GROSSER: But the "European" reality, after all, would be a system in which France and Great Britain alone would have the control over nuclear weapons, while the Federal Republic once again would merely provide the infantry. I do not see any German government which could accept something like that, much less than the nuclear control of the super power United States. On the other hand, however, neither France or Great Britain nor the United States or the Soviet Union would agree to give the Federal Republic--in opposition to all signed treaties--a voice in nuclear decision-making along with England and France.

SPIEGEL: But that is something which almost nobody in the Federal Republic wants.

GROSSER: After all, France and England hold the view that without the American guarantee there cannot be an effective protection for Europe. It is admitted in France that in 1966 we were able to expel American troops from our country only because we knew that between France and the Soviet Union there lies a Germany in which the Americans remained stationed.

SPIEGEL: Is the destructive power of the small "Force de frappe" not still large enough to deter the Soviet Union from any aggression through a threat of a devastating second strike?

GROSSER: No, I do not think so, the actual strategic idea behind the Force de frappe was always. . .

SPIEGEL: . . . to keep everything in check that is located east of France.

GROSSER: No, but perhaps to force America, in case of a nuclear poker game, to side with Europe, in other words to constitute an additional deterring element of insecurity vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

SPIEGEL: A French nuclear guarantee for the existence of the Federal Republic would evidently also meet with another obstacle. The former prime minister Couve de Murville recently warned the Germans that the French are by no means more courageous or more selfless in regard to sacrificing themselves for the Germans than, say, the Americans.

GROSSER: The French government, you see, would have to make it completely clear that the soil of the Federal Republic is regarded like the soil of France. But it is said in Paris only halfway and then also is taken back. The chief of the Gaullists, Chirac, for example, in 1975 spoke in favor of it, in

1979 qualified his statements, and in 1983 finally made them once again more pointed. As for the rest, Mitterand appears to go farther here than Giscard.

SPIEGEL: In other words, once again the Germans do not know where they stand with the French.

GROSSER: It is understandable that people in Paris are afraid of saying that in death the Germans and the Frenchs are united.

SPIEGEL: All the more surprising do many Germans perceive the fact that the socialist state president of France constantly preaches to his comrades in the Federal Republic that they should, please, permit American medium-range missiles on their territory, and thus greatly embarrasses the SPD.

GROSSER: That the relations between the two socialist parties are not good is not an unheard-of fact, indeed! At first the French in the eyes of the German Social Democrats were an evil occupation power, which was fought by Kurt Schumacher. Then the German socialists were anti-European, while the French were Europeans. However, when the German socialists became European, the French were the colonialists of the Algerian War. In other words, that the SPD and the Socialist Party of France for one reason or another are almost hostile to one another was, unfortunately, since 1945 more frequently the case than cheerful and friendly cooperation.

SPIEGEL: Who, in your eyes, has changed here most frequently, most drastically?

GROSSER: Mitterand, but the German Social Democrats recently even more. The former have changed because he came to power, the latter because they lost it.

SPIEGEL: But how much credibility does a French state president have who tells the Europeans that they should accept the American missiles, but by no means wants to see these missiles on French soil?

GROSSER: Personally I would not be opposed.

SPIEGEL: The French emphasize that they have already contributed their share to Western deterrence, but they oppose the counting of this share in the Geneva talks. How do the French deal with this contradiction?

GROSSER: There is, indeed, a contradiction there. But it is smaller than it is portrayed to be in the Federal Republic. The main strength of the Force de frappe, you see, lies in the nuclear submarines, but these are not counted by Moscow among the medium-range missiles.

SPIEGEL: As the result of modernization and national counterarmament, the Force de frappe will be tripled in the next three years anyhow. The short-range missiles of the "Pluton" Type, for example, will be replaced by the longer-range missiles of the "Hades" Type.

GROSSER: This should be a reason for rejoicing for the Germans, for the



"Hadès" missiles fire beyond the Federal Republic. Previously, the French always told the Germans: "As soon as the Soviets have entered your cities, we will destroy them there." This, of course, did not demonstrate any special brotherliness.

SPIEGEL: But until the deployment of the "Hadès" missiles at the beginning of the 1990's the Germans will still have to live with the fact that the French defend them through missiles which, in the case of war, will come down on German cities.

GROSSER: You must not overlook: The "Pluton" missile was, first of all, a toy, which was given to the French army because it has no nuclear bombers and no nuclear submarines.

SPIEGEL: But that is no reason to give it a missile which is fired specifically at the Germans. . .

GROSSER: . . . no, which is not to be fired at all and will not be fired.

SPIEGEL: You once said that the purpose of the Force de frappe is to balance the economic strength of the Federal Republic through the military strength of France. But in actual fact the French nuclear missiles have not made any change in the economic weakness of France vis-à-vis the Federal Republic.

GROSSER: The fact that France possesses nuclear weapons does, however, benefit the international status of the country.

SPIEGEL: And for this reason French soldiers are permitted to die in Lebanon. The French self-perception, it seems, requires that.

GROSSER: No, the German non-self-perception prevents the strong economic power Federal Republic from playing a similar role as the not-so-strong economic power France. For historical reasons, no German chancellor can carry the responsibility in the foreseeable future to deploy German soldiers outside the Federal Republic, even if it be for pure peace tasks.

SPIEGEL: But who wants that? Thank God, no one, and the Germans do not want it at all.

GROSSER: But the fact that they do not want it is in contradiction with the fact that they also do not accord the Americans such deployment. For one cannot say simultaneously: We do not want that America helps shape the course of events anywhere in the world (which at times presupposes military presence or threat), but we ourselves do not want to bear any responsibility. After the attack on the French peace troop in Beirut, one read between the lines of the German press: "There you see what results from this."

SPIEGEL: And do you not see it?

GROSSER: I consider it a good thing that the French soldiers are there, but of course not if the same sort of reprisals are practiced of which Israel



had been rightly accused. I would prefer to see a joint European presence there.

SPIEGEL: That would be the last straw for the Europeans.

GROSSER: Because of the fact that the Germans would not participate, a European solution is not possible.

SPIEGEL: Mr Grosser, can there be political agreement at all between two states which since the Second World War have developed so differently: On the one hand there is France, with its uninterrupted self-perception, its strong sense of feeling for the state and a certain sense of mission; on the other hand, there are the Germans who lack all of these things. The French still want to pursue functions of maintaining order in the world, the Germans say: "World politics, no thanks!"

GROSSER: The Germans, after all, were just at the point of developing somewhat more responsibility for the course of events in the world when the debate on counterarmament broke out. That this development was stopped, I regard as the most negative consequence of the debate over the Pershing. Whether in the long run it is justifiable to tell the Americans that they are either sissies or imperialists, it seems to me, is very dubious.

SPIEGEL: In defense and security questions, a German-French agreement cannot be expected, in parts not even a discussion. Both countries, to be sure, have common problems in other areas as well, but hardly talk about them: Unemployment, reduction of working hours, guest workers, environment, and nuclear energy. The German-French summit meetings, now 42 in number, have become a ritual without content.

GROSSER: I do not agree with your statement. There are even highly paradox phenomena: Since the Christian Democrats have come to power in Bonn and the Socialists in Paris, a far-reaching consensus has developed between, say, the ministers Schwarz-Schilling and Mexandeau in the sphere of the establishment of cable television.

SPIEGEL: In regard to the missile question even François Mitterand and Franz Josef Strauss agree. Is that not terrible?

GROSSER: No one knows what Franz Josef Strauss's opinion will be when this interview appears. If the range of problems you have indicated is not thoroughly discussed, the reason is that both governments are consoling their peoples with the assertion that the crisis of the Western industrial society is merely temporary. If the governments do not dare to call the evil by its name, they, of course, speak only among themselves, not about it.

SPIEGEL: But it has been this way for a rather long time.

GROSSER: Yes, and that is why the Germans are devoting themselves with fervor to the debate about the Pershing missiles, and the French, with the same fervor, to the debate over what is socialism and what is not.

SPIEGEL: But in Germany there is, for example, a debate over environmental questions, which is a part of the debate over the crisis. In France there is no such discussion. The Germans are horrified by the dying of forests, the French, whose forests are likewise endangered, do not see the problem at all.

GROSSER: I would, first of all, have named the common lack of understanding with respect to the crisis in the ship-yards and in mining. But there are, of course, differences in the political culture. Die Wirtschaft [The economy] and der Wald [the forest] have a sound in German which is untranslatable, like la Republique [the Republic] in French.

SPIEGEL: So for the expert on the Germans Alfred Grosser, too, the Germans are the "people from the forest", the sentimental, naive romantics. After all, it was a German minister of the interior, not exactly regarded as being hostile to industry, who undertook to require the use of lead-free gasoline from the German automobile industry beginning in 1986. In France no one as yet is thinking about this. Is it not shocking that such problems, which reach into the future, can evidently not be jointly approached?

GROSSER: Of course, joint action would be better. But once again, I would not put the lead-free gasoline at the top of the list, but rather the conversion of the automobile industry to a more promising production in the future.

SPIEGEL: In actual fact, apart from the airbus, there is no industrial future project of significance which Germans and French are pursuing jointly, but instead a number of French-Japanese and German-Japanese enterprises. Why, exactly, is that so?

GROSSER: Because every time, when something European could come into being, the country which is not leading or in administrative charge protests vehemently.

SPIEGEL: This brings to mind France, above all.

GROSSER: There is, indeed, the case that France in the computer industry gave preference to the American firm of Honeywell instead of the European Unidata, because in the latter the Dutch firm of Philips would have been in administrative charge. But there is also the case of Thomson-Brandt-Grundig: The fusion was rejected by the Germans primarily because a French state enterprise would have been in administrative charge. The result is that Thomson-Brandt today works together with a Japanese firm.

SPIEGEL: In other words, the Europe of the fatherlands apparently cannot be destroyed in industry either.

GROSSER: But there is a fundamental difference: The French want a joint economy because they believe that the economy needs state impulses. But they do not want any joint political authority because this violates their sacred sovereignty. The Germans, on the other hand, want a joint policy and would be

willing to give up some sovereignty. But every time they arrive at the conclusion that they touch the borders of communism if a state or interstate authority gains specific influence on the economy.

SPIEGEL: Has what originally was regarded as the basic consensus of the Common Market not come to nought between the two states? The French said to the Germans: "You finance our agricultural market and you receive in exchange the free trade for your industry." In the meantime the German farmers, too, profit from the frontier equalization, and the French clearly feel themselves disadvantaged.

GROSSER: But in Germany there is much too little recognition of the fact that French protectionism in Europe is far less important than one had reason to fear when the Socialists took office.

SPIEGEL: But then free trade was a basic condition of the Treaties of Rome.

GROSSER: If you take into account the protectionist tradition of the French Left, it has conducted itself in an enormously positive manner.

SPIEGEL: If one now, after 20 years of the German-French Treaty, draws up a balance sheet, one can surely put a positive assessment on the fact that today no one anymore speaks of hereditary enmity between Germans and French, that there is an intensive youth and cultural exchange. But one also must ask the question of whether in this exchange the wrong images are not often transported in the form of old or also new cliches, as in the films "Lili Marleen" or "Lola".

GROSSER: Yes, the young German film, for example, absolutely also has negative consequences. It makes believable what the directors from Fassbinder to Margarethe von Trotta declare: "We are the only Germans who, in a sea of the forgetting of the German past, represent the real ethic of the Federal Republic." The success of such films in France is explained in part by the fact that they confirm the views of Frenchmen who are still distrustful, viz., that the Germans do not think enough about the past.

SPIEGEL: But the success of the young German film, after all, is based above all on its artistic quality.

GROSSER: Of course. In global terms, I would like to assess the state of relations as an optimist. And an optimist is someone who says that things, after all, could be much worse.

SPIEGEL: Has the normalization of German-French relations not also entailed a trivialization? In the 19th century, for example, the French elite was fascinated by the anti-model Germany, while today the intellectuals of the two countries, after all, have little to say to one another. Has the German-French relationship not lost a great deal of its inner tension?

GROSSER: The intellectuals do, indeed, have relatively little to say to one another, for they are incapable of providing answers to the questions which

are raised by the crisis. In their own country, too, they are no longer regarded as socio-political prophets. For this reason they have to replace the deficit through pacifist fervor in the FRG. In France, on the other hand, through excessive self-presentation in the rejection of pacifism.

SPIEGEL: But in the French Left, too, there used to be a pacifism. What exactly happened to it?

GROSSER: It no longer exists today, precisely because it used to exist. The trauma of French pacifism is the fact that it ended in the Munich Agreement of 1938 and in the defeat of 1940. We capitulated before Hitler because we were weak in terms of will and weapons. For this reason we say: "Never again give in to pressure from the outside!" The Germans, by contrast, have the trauma of 1939, when Germany started the war. For this reason the Germans say today: "Never again war from German soil." But the question of how war can be prevented is a more controversial subject in Germany than among us.

SPIEGEL: Since the end of the war you have been a kind of mediator between Germany and France. Do you find it a pity that this role is not in such great demand now?

GROSSER: I believe that the mediator is in demand now as before. I seldom had to swim against such a strong current of lack of understanding in both countries.

SPIEGEL: Mr Grosser, we thank you for this discussion.

8970

CSO: 8120/0571-C

## FOREIGN MINISTER ON NATO TIES, EC, BARENTS SEA TALKS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Dec 83 p 3

[Article: "Foreign Minister Stray on the Missile Conflict: A Strengthened NATO Alliance"]

[Text] "NATO has emerged strengthened from the missile conflict. The implementation of the doubling resolution of 1979 has welded the members of the alliance together and one can notice greater calm on the matter." So states Foreign Minister Sverre Stray in an interview with NTB [Norwegian Telegram Bureau] at the beginning of the year. Even though the international situation is marked by harsher words between the super powers, Stray believes that this is a far cry from the days of the Cold War. "The super powers are clear about the common interests they have in preserving peace and finding a way to more practical modes of cooperation," notes the foreign minister.

"Nato has begun a slow and careful stationing of the new missiles. Should there be a later accord, they can be removed. There has always been debate on the role of nuclear weapons in the common defense." Stray points to the demonstrations of the 1960's, but adds that the extent of the protests has been greater recently. And the debate certainly will continue.

Simultaneously, there is a continued demand for increased conventional forces. But Stray doubts that the people of Western Europe will prefer guns over butter.

"I am afraid that there will always be difficulties in democratic countries in obtaining adequate support for the requisite military defense," he says, adding, "All responsible parties desire improved conventional balance to reduce the dependency on nuclear weapons."

The foreign minister notes that there is continued support for NATO membership--notwithstanding the discussion over nuclear weapons. He expects that this debate will continue in the parliament in the spring session in connection with the report on security and disarmament.

Stray hopes that the debate will be held on a more realistic level, and that it will not be based upon hope and wishes which overlook the realities.

"If one is to have any hope for progress in the disarmament negotiations, one must put forth proposals which have some chance of being accepted by the super powers; otherwise the proposals will have little significance," he points out.

#### EC-Norway

Stray agrees that the outcome of the EC summit meeting in Athens was disappointing, but adds that the ministers really had not expected anything else. "There might rather have been a meeting of lesser officials if there were to have been a resolution of the many complicated questions which were on the agenda. EC cooperation continues and the value of being a member can be seen best in the eagerness with which Spain and Portugal seek to join." Sverre Stray doubts that there is a possibility to bring about a Norwegian debate on EC until new circumstances form a basis for it. Norway's economic problems with EC are mostly solved, and political-security considerations which should dictate membership lie far in the future.

"Would membership in EC afford political weight in the negotiations with the Soviet Union concerning a pull-back at the border in the Barents Sea? Could it not strengthen the Norwegian bargaining position?"

Stray answers that this is naturally a possibility which cannot be overlooked. "The border negotiations will continue to be a two-sided question. But as concerns management of resources, which the Soviets want to be a Norwegian-Soviet affair, the Soviet authorities would have been required to negotiate with the EC Commission in Brussels. Membership in EC would in all likelihood have given political weight, but as noted, membership is not on the agenda of Norwegian politics," Foreign Minister Stray maintains.

"Will the development of missile and offshore technology increase problems in connection with finding solutions in the Barents Sea?"

Stray responds that surely one must count on military issues in the Barents Sea area being a factor which has a bearing in the Soviet Union's evaluations.

As concerns reports on cruise missiles on board ships in Norwegian waters, Stray states: "According to international law, ocean areas up to territorial borders are open to all navigation. And that pertains obviously also to the areas being discussed by Norway and the Soviet Union."

Stray notes that should the Soviets discover oil in fields which extend into the disputed area in the Barents Sea, the government has various options. But he declined to discuss this further. The Cabinet reiterates that delivery of off-shore equipment must take place pursuant to normal commercial terms and in accordance with OECD [Organization for European Economic Cooperation] and CIGOM [Inter-American Trade Center] decisions.



## Mid-East

In realistic terms no immediate solution for the Mid-East can be seen. The most we can hope for is that the reconciliation negotiations in Geneva can establish peaceful conditions in Lebanon.

Stray maintains that forces from the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy are needed in the Mid-East in order to prevent the conflict from becoming more extensive. "The presence of this force there must be viewed as a signal to others to show restraint."

The position of the government concerning Norwegian UNIFIL [United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon] forces is that they have no--or in any case, very little--responsibility. In consideration of the costs and personnel resources being called for, one must ask whether it is reasonable to continue with this.

"We have taken up the question with the UN whether there should be a thinning out of UNIFIL forces," states the foreign minister, who has this to say about the South African question: "Norway has for many years supported the proposition that the Security Council should pass a binding resolution on an oil boycott. But we must confront the reality that every attempt will be vetoed in the Security Council."

Stray notes that the conference in Stockholm on efforts at increased trust and confidence is, in many respects, something new. "Here it is not only countries from the two great alliances which sit together at the conference table, but also neutral and nonaligned countries which can give another perspective to the discussions," Foreign Minister Stray emphasizes.

12573

CSO: 3639/56



## CONSERVATIVE PARTY VOTERS DISILLUSIONED WITH COALITION

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Jan 84 p 2

[Commentary by Hakan Hagwall]

[Text] The Norwegian nonsocialist three-party government coalition has now finished its first season. It was last summer that Kare Willoch's Conservative government was expanded to become a three-party coalition with the same prime minister. The Center Party and the Christian People's Party joined the government.

Before that these two middle parties had served as support parties in Storting. Neither the Conservatives nor the support parties were really satisfied with the situation. The government party felt that parliamentary work was too unmanageable with all the trips it took to consolidate the government's proposals. From the government's point of view, the work was not always productive either. The compromises it required were much too costly.

The middle parties, on the other hand, decided that they would have more influence as members of the government. They wanted a "hand on the wheel."

It can be said that the formation of this three-party government resulted more from strategic considerations than from considerations of specific policies. That at least is a view put forth by the Norwegian opposition. That is also, according to the same opposition people, why the government is obviously suffering from paralysis of action as a result of the conflicts among the three parties and of the fact that Prime Minister Willoch leads the government with a hard hand, always draws the longest straw and thus insures that the government pursues a clearly Conservative policy.

This description does not seem to hold together entirely.

But if one looks at the parliamentary results, it is clear that the three-party government has been successful in its first season. It pushed its bills through Storting to an extent hitherto unknown. For example it is very unusual that a government has managed to get its budget approved by Storting with so few changes.

The obvious reflection of this is that the opposition accuses the government parties of selfsufficiency and a dogged resistance to negotiating with the opposition. That after all is the standing view of any parliamentary opposition anywhere when the government does not have to rely on outside support.

But at times things have hung by a thread for the Willoch government too. The Labor Party's demand for a Norwegian repudiation of NATO's deployment of new missiles was defeated by a Storting majority of a single vote. The decision caused a lot of anguish in the middle parties. If they had not joined the government, the majority on this question would undoubtedly have gone the other way.

Although no open cabinet question was ever raised, it is certain that Willoch would have had to resign if he had been opposed by Storting on the "missile issue."

There was a great deal of talk in Norway about a cabinet question in December. Some newspapers have reported that Prime Minister Willoch uses the threat of resigning almost routinely as a method of getting his own way with the other government parties. This was said to have happened four times in a 4-week period and in several cases it involved very peripheral matters.

Once it concerned the sinking of the wrecked Kielland platform. This was on its way to being sunk at sea after having been turned and gone through, when it turned out that a Storting majority favored landing the platform and cutting it up instead. But the government had it sunk. Another time it was the grant to a film company (!) that almost touched off a parliamentary crisis. A third time it involved the government's proposed fishing subsidy arrangement when there were nonsocialist rebels in Storting. But the government made sure they voted the right way.

The fourth case was the most important. It involved the big state-owned oil company, Statoil. The Labor Party wanted a decision as soon as possible allowing Statoil to take over the Statfjord goldmine. The Conservatives did not want any decision now. In the middle party Storting groups, there were some who leaned toward the Labor Party while others wanted to bring about some kind of compromise. But so far Willoch has managed to block any concessions.

These four occasions when Willoch allegedly threatened to resign have been turned inside out and backward and forward for weeks in the Norwegian debate. Willoch himself and the two other government party leaders say they know nothing of any threats. From time to time we have had different views in the government but so far we have had no trouble reaching agreement, was the government leaders' response to the talk which they described as something pulled out of thin air.

And there is undoubtedly some fire behind this smoke. What does seem quite clear is that the government's cooperation problems do not arise within the

government but in Storting. There are people in the Storting groups of the middle parties who will no unhesitatingly go along with expediting what their leaders have agreed to with the Conservatives inside the government.

But if the government has done well this fall from a parliamentary point of view, this is not true when it comes to public opinion. Political commentators in Norway are as taken up with opinion polls as we are in Sweden. Thus the newspapers print one or several opinion polls each week.

The overall impression one gets from them is this very clear picture:

There would be a change in government if Norway held an election now. A majority of the Norwegian people feel that Gro Harlem Brundtland was a better prime minister than Kare Willoch. All the government parties have lost ground compared to the 1981 election. The Conservative Party in particular has done poorly and has lost voters to both right (to the Progressive Party) and left (to the Labor Party).

Perhaps the strangest result is this: a majority of the Norwegian people think it was a bad thing for Norway that the Conservative government was expanded to become a nonsocialist three-party government. It is true that middle party voters do not share this view. But both Conservative and Labor voters preferred the straight Conservative government to the coalition.

Therefore there has been a good deal of speculation that the Conservatives should break up the government and turn government power over to the middle parties for the rest of the election period. (There is no possibility for a new election in Norway.)

But all ideas of this kind are flatly rejected by prominent Conservatives. They view the three-party cooperation as a national interest even if it has a negative effect on the party's own popularity. The philosophy expressed by, "The hell with Norway as long as it is good for the Conservatives," is not for them.

6578

CSO: 3650/99

## POLITICAL FUTURE OF FINANCE, PLANNING MINISTER LOPES DISCUSSED

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 Dec 83 pp 20R-21R

[Article by Joao Carreira Bom: "Ernani Lopes, National Personality of the Year"]

[Text] EXPRESSO's choice for National Personality of 1983, Ernani Lopes, who became well known for the 2.8 percent he imposed in 10 months time, has come to be identified by the citizens of Portugal with their economic difficulties. The minister of finance is one of the key figures in the executive branch of the Central Bloc--an alliance for two periods of time only, one of which has not yet been completed. EXPRESSO regards this alliance as the national event of the year.

"He is the Salazar of the 21st century!"

During the luncheon hour, at a restaurant between Sintra and Ericeira, one could hear the man audibly swallowing the long interview the minister of finance had on television the preceding evening.

"Everything is moving toward bankruptcy. The sharp dealers are appearing at the doors of the factories closing down, buying everything at bargain prices and getting rich overnight. But they know what they are doing. They even inspire fear... They have no doubt: he is the Salazar of the 21st century. Either they get him out now or they will have to wait until he falls from his chair!"

The meal was cooling, but the man continued to talk. A toy salesman, he listed the difficulties: "No one is buying, and if they do, they do not pay." His panegyric protest interrupted the conversation of a group, in which the fear caused by the tax burden was offset by the statistical differences concerning the repetitive statements by Ernani Lopes. Someone said: "It matters little to me that the purists consider the expression 'in terms of' incorrect. I have now heard it pro and con, and it is intolerable." And here the disagreement began: "You exaggerate, because I was counting, beginning with the first 10 minutes, and I established an average of one 'in terms of' every 24 words."

They were all involved in this arithmetic when the salesman silenced them, not because of the excessive decibel level, but because he disagreed with the

prediction the group made about the effects of the minister's first television interview. Where the young professional graduates saw deception, conceptual poverty and even emptiness, the salesman, totally unconcerned with Portuguese and economic syntax, glimpsed the demiurge manipulating the strings, of which he, an ordinary individual, only sees the lower portion. He blamed him for all the evil occurring in his business dealings, but he feared him, exaggerated him, despite his own height of almost 2 meters. In brief, he transformed him into a statesman, a providential figure, placing him, for better or for worse, at the heart of the supermajority bloc.

#### A Concession to the Poor

If a year and a half of government is not enough for the emergence of a statesman, and if any doubts remain as to the success of the recessive policy decreed by him, one thing however seems certain: Ernani Lopes, at 41, until just a few months ago unknown to the vast majority of the public, has increasingly become the man the citizens of Portugal identify with their economic difficulties.

It could be argued that it is Mario Soares, as prime minister, who will reap the best fruit of the success or failure of this policy. However, before winning the elections, the socialist leader was already a determining factor in the life of the country, while the ambassador in Brussels enjoyed the benefits of something like a legend, being confined to the mythology of the "political class" and the excellent references from financial circles. He was an invented personality, but in less than half a year, he entered into a universe involving millions of people, becoming, then, the national figure of the year.

Obviously this falls far short of guaranteeing him a political future, because it is a known fact that one falls more quickly than one rises, and that a minister without party affiliations in a bipartisan bloc may be sacrificed, as soon as the arithmetic of what is "mine" and what is "yours" so dictates. And this is independent of the success of his policy. It may in truth be his very success which will cause his elimination, since his prestige has risen in a way like a star which dims all the others (including that of the prime minister).

According to some predictions, he has even been assigned the noble mission of giving austerity a face, such as to allow the government, when it wants to change its image, to do so merely by replacing the individual and saying: "This man has rendered great service to the country, but perhaps he went too far in some ways. Now things will be different." In this interpretation, there would be a figure playing the role which fell to Cavaco Silva in the Sa Carneiro government: a concession to the poor, in order to facilitate the presidential candidacy of Mario Soares.

#### Uncertain Political Future

Obviously, this linear prediction points to a perversity which definitely does not characterize the prime minister. What is happening is that Ernani



Lopes is navigating in high seas, and his vessel is a nutshell. He may find a way to rise above the crisis, but he is still awaiting the end of the storm, and a total shipwreck would not be necessary to return him to the functions of an efficient ambassador.

It could be said, therefore, that his political future is uncertain, whether or not he guides his vessel safely to port. Only, if he is successful in the economy and in politics, his dedicated spirit may become completely identified with the myth being built around him. And this is perhaps why, because he is simultaneously a fragile political link in the Central Bloc and an objective candidate with a "charismatic" personality, some individuals in the opposition within the PSD [Social Democratic Party] have attacked him. He emerged from his ivory tower for the Central Bloc cause, to some extent he represents the Central Bloc (which he defended with Eanes in 1978), and, if it needs him to survive one day, it will be because Ernani Lopes has again joined the PSD, or has affiliated with the PS [Socialist Party] or again, because within the Central Bloc, the strange circumstance of two parties needing an "independent" in order to continue an alliance has occurred. And here, the salesman in the restaurant at the edge of the road would be right: the son of a modest tailor, thanks to his efficiency, his incommunicability, his harshness, his practicing Catholicism and his authoritarianism, would in that event have become something like a "Salazar of the 21st century."

#### "Prussian Ambassador"

It is necessary somehow to keep the bright star which has followed his rise from fading: 8 years ago, when Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves sent him to Bonn, they perhaps expected something different, but they encountered what they themselves were to call later, in eulogistic fashion, "our Prussian ambassador." In 1983, when he finally was appointed to the finance post, he was faced with a more favorable international situation than in the past 2 years (resumption of growth in the developed countries and a reduction in the price of oil). Now, after 6 months in the government, it is still unclear whether this bright star has abandoned him.

Already he can pride himself on having been the first minister since 25 April to present the state budget on time. He began and concluded negotiations with the International Monetary Fund, making a debatable choice, but one regarded as the only alternative under the present circumstances. He resumed foreign payments. He obtained from an EEC suffering a more acute crisis than usual, a statement on the farm issue likely to untangle some of the difficulties in Portugal's membership. He imposed the famous 28 percent [sic], at great social cost it is true, but with fewer adverse political effects than might have been expected, since the opposition was unable to make partisan profit from this attack on the citizens' pockets. And, last month, he heard Vitor Constancio express agreement with his choices (when the opposite had been predicted in various circles), although he did call attention to the possibility of a greater recession than predicted in the course of 1984.



## Fading Star

To date, the bright star seems to have stayed with him. It is simply that one cannot forget that, since a consensus among the social partners is a basic goal of the government, the finance minister falls far short of having been efficient in this connection. There has not even been any mention of what might serve as a tool for this policy: the Economic and Social Council. And if the support of some economic agents was obtained at the beginning of his government actions, Ernani Lopes has seen discontent among businessmen far removed from the direct influence of the opposition (political or social) increase. At the same time, what can be said about the "managers' dance"? Can it be consistent with the desire to "reorganize and moralize" the public sector? Or should one conclude that a few changes cannot halt the narrow traditional processes of party profit sharing? Here in fact the minister's star is fading.

Its brilliance will be put to the test next year, with the presentation of the economic recovery program, the lack of which has been one of the main criticisms of the former ambassador. It is a question of seeing how the Central Bloc "to be established" functions after adhering to the restrictions. This will coincide with an assessment (still difficult today) of the results of the austerity policy. We will then know if there will be a greater recession than predicted and if the critics of the IMF option, who regard the increase in dependence on foreign sources, the interruption of investments and other containment measures as a means of postponing problems and further aging already antiquated structures, were right.

If the facts bear out their arguments, well-known economists will abandon their paraphrasing of foreign authors and their flank attacks. They will not spare Ernani Lopes.

5157

CSO: 8142/0554-F

## TURKISH 'DEMOCRACY', CYPRIOT 'INDEPENDENCE' CALLED SHAMS

London ISCININ SESI in Turkish 21 Nov 83 p 1

[Article by Cemile Cakmak: "'Democracy' Comes to Turkey, 'Independence' to Northern Cyprus"]

[Text] Turkey has "democracy"; Northern Cyprus has "independence"!

The day of the 6 November elections which brought Turkey its "democracy," there was a meeting of the NSC [National Security Council]. There were rumors about the NSC's "fixing votes" at this meeting. "Greatly alarmed" by this, Evren says, "If such had been the NSC's intention, the elections would not have been held."

Ozal, who "won" the election, also shares Evren's "alarm" and says, "Unfortunately, many statements came out abroad to the effect that these elections were a fixed election... I do not believe that there can now be any validity to a claim by anyone that there was the slightest fraud in the elections."

Having thus proved that there was no "fraud" in the elections, it was automatically obvious that the elections were "democratic," but it is being stressed once more just in case. Evren, explaining that the "elections were totally democratic," said, "A voting rate in excess of 92 percent has not occurred in any other elections to date... There is nothing else anyone can say." (TERCUMAN, 9 November 1983)

Compulsory voting, penalties for not voting and a ban on casting invalid votes have hardly occurred before, either! And setting up as an example of being "totally democratic" an election in which it could be determined this clearly beforehand what the parties that would run for election would eat, what they would drink and what they would pull out of the ballot box is something which, we would think, has never occurred before.

Just because the NSC says "there was no fraud in the vote count" is no reason for anyone to believe it! The NSC is a "supremely capable" body, capable of any sort of fraud. But as long as it cannot be proved that there was any "fraud in the votes," there is no need to waste time on speculation and argument. Let us say that the NSC committed no "fraud in the votes." The basic fraud is the election itself, anyway.

There is an effort afoot to draw a parallel between the concept of a "fixed election" and an "election in which there was no fraud in the votes." Even if there was no fraud in the votes, this was all the more a fixed election along fascist lines. There is nothing else to be said, in fact, to the ones who flaunt such an election as an example of being "totally democratic," because "anyone who does not understand ought to be horsewhipped."

Ozal said, "Communism cannot be defeated by muscle power." If communism cannot be defeated by muscle, it can certainly never be defeated by the head! This is something altogether different. Our comment on that here is that Ozal's muscle must all be in his head. What else besides muscle is being used against communism in Turkey today?

In our previous issue, we printed some conversations that took place at the TDHSK [expansion unknown] conference. There were some very important observations among the comments of certain people who did not even have any connection with communism. One of them said that Turkey was taking the lead in reactionary politics. Another said that Turkey and its reactionary partners were trying to redefine democracy. In fact, by flaunting "fascist-like fixed elections" as an example of being "totally democratic," Turkey becomes a dreadful focus of reactionism!

The significance of this focus lies in its location and function. It is otherwise utterly cheap and disdainful. The fawning of the bourgeois newspapers, as well as the propaganda that "they could fix" the elections are indicative of this. Sunalp supposedly said, "You can't show me one fascist country." Fish in the sea cannot see the water! A week before Ozal said communism could not be defeated by muscle, he said, "We will crush anyone who attempts an incident," and said the communists had no alternative to the 24 January decisions. Then Ozal's "mainmast" is something of a puzzle. It is hard to see where the "main" comes in in this "mainmast" which includes workers and poor villagers. Ozal must be seeing everything in terms of being "in the main" because he feels himself to be so precarious and groundless!

Despite all this lack of quality, the entire so-called bourgeois opposition is circling like flies around the reactionary focus. While Barlas, for example, first talked about the trial run for democracy, he switched within 20 days to discussion of the fulfillment of the timetable for democracy. The trial lasted for 20 days! More examples could be listed. What sets the bourgeois opposition buzzing around the reactionary focus is not the quality of the reaction, but the counterrevolutionary status of the bourgeois class.

Turkey, the reactionary focus, is preparing to spread the germs of reactionism to the entire region. The United States, having boldly invaded Grenada on the one hand, is conducting a bloody, aggressive operation in Lebanon on the other. Bayulken has said that Turkey supports the American "peace" force in Lebanon! With all this sympathy for "peace" and the "peace force," Turkey could hardly forego pressing on to the South. Taking advantage of the present confusion in the Middle East and as a result of specific bargaining it is understood to have conducted with the United States, it proclaimed "independence" in Northern Cyprus.

The "independence" in Northern Cyprus is an indicator of Turkey's attempt to redefine in the most reactionary terms not only "democracy," but the concept of "independence" as well. What independence, in an occupied country! It seems that the "people" have determined their own destiny!

Doubtless, the reactionary effort to alter even the concepts is not in vain. It shows how afraid the people are of the impulse to democracy and independence. Fear is not fatal, and the people's fight for independence and democracy will be victorious!

As for what will be an important example of this victory in our region -- the communists' alternatives to now-Prime Minister Ozal's 24 January decisions in Turkey: The communist alternative is found in the draft of the Turkish Communist Party's Fourth Program, and this alternative will circumvent heads, go straight to muscle and bring the reactionary world down upon itself!

8349

CSO: 3554/85

## DRAFT TEXT OF TCP'S 'FOURTH PROGRAM'

London ISCININ SESI in Turkish 21 Nov 83 (Supl) pp 3-20

[Second draft of new TCP program, published in special supplement to 21 Nov 83 issue of ISCININ SESI: "Fourth Program Draft Debate"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] 4th Program, Draft II

1. Ours Is Age of Transition from Capitalism to Communism

Ours is the age of transition from capitalism to communism through proletarian revolutions. The principal contradiction of this age is between socialism and imperialism.

The world, as well as imperialism, is ripe for socialism as a whole. Our era opened with the Great October Socialist Revolution. The 1917 revolution initiated a totally new configuration in the world balance of power, ended imperialism's unrivaled reign, and reduced socialism from theory to practice. It added great impetus to the working class and popular struggle for liberation. The general crisis of capitalism began with World War I and, essentially, with the October Revolution.

Socialism became a world system through the revolutions which took place in various nations following the heavy blow dealt imperialism by the Soviet Union and its definitive role in dismantling fascism in World War II. Today, there are two world systems, but a single world marketplace. The capitalist and socialist sectors are its mutually opposite parts. The socialism-imperialism contradiction aggravates the contradictions of the capitalist system and speeds the revolutionary processes.

World Socialist System

The socialist system is a system which excludes colonialist relationships and requires the cooperation of people and states on a base of proletarian internationalism.

The world socialist system, current socialism is the greatest gain of the world working class. It is, by its existence and practical solidarity, the solid support of the working class and the people against imperialism.



The principal power of the world socialist system, the Soviet Union, is the revolutionary capital of the world. As the most advanced socialist nation economically and socially, it is the site of the working class movement's highest achievement. The Soviet Union's status as the revolutionary capital of the world, for this reason, is an objective circumstance, independent of the policy it pursues.

The revolutionary capital of the world has a profound influence on the process of world revolution.

The TCP [Turkish Communist Party] deals with the world role played by the Soviet Union from the standpoint of world revolution and appreciates it in the context of this fundamental goal. The interests of world revolution proceed from the interests of all of its parts, including the Soviet Union.

### World Capitalist System

The world capitalist economy is not the simple sum of autonomous, national capitalist economies, but an organic whole, an hierarchy based on colonialism and force. The nations or national communities in the various grades of this hierarchy have different roles within the imperialistic colonial system.

The structure of the world capitalist economic system is changing under the impact of the gradual strengthening of the world socialist system, the agitation of the working class and the people and the scientific and technological revolution. New things are happening in the international division of labor, the structure and geographical distribution of international trade and in the regional shift of capital and the labor force.

Production and trade throughout the world are gradually taking the place of a division of labor planned on a world scale by the monopolies.

Industrial production in the less developed countries holds a meaningful position in the international division of labor for the first time since capitalism came into being in the world.

There is a chronic crisis in the imperialist nations. U.S. hegemony in the capitalist world is receding, and geopolitical relationships are changing throughout the world.

The imperialist nations which have had no compunction about their divide-and-conquer policy against the less developed countries find themselves divided also. The rifts are not just economic, but political as well.

Unemployment, shrinking production, compulsory shorter work weeks and mass layoffs have become a standard part of life in the imperialist /nations/. Spending for social services, retirement pensions and health insurance is steadily being cut back. Meanwhile, the profits, foreign investments, production capacity and work force utilization of the imperialist /monopolies/ are increasing.

Unemployment and hidden unemployment rates in the less developed countries exceed 100 million, and as the traditional structure of capitalist agriculture deteriorates, this number climbs even higher.

Effective demand in the LDC's is low and the domestic market, modest. For this reason, developing industries become export-oriented. Once industry achieves a certain density, it must either sell its goods abroad or die.

The market for the industrializing LDC's is foreign countries, especially the imperialist countries. This is an important link in the LDC's dependence on imperialism.

The colonial nations of the "old" division of labor of the world capitalist economic system were the agricultural and raw materials storehouses. Now the same relationship is occurring at the industrial level. All of the technology, science and industry which made possible the development of capitalism on a world scale are today still under the thumb of imperialism. This is the other link in the LDC's dependence on imperialism.

The export-oriented industrialization emerging in the LDC's is not solving, but aggravating their socio-economic problems. Income distribution is being thrown further out of balance. Social expectations are rising, but cannot be met. To the extent that this industrialization takes root a "chronic state of being less developed" reproduces itself.

The LDC's, and especially the middle tier countries where development is rapid, are, therefore, the regions where conflicts and crises have become focused. These nations are the weak links in the world imperialist system.

The need for and actual use of brute force and undisguised dictatorship against the people is an on-going feature in the LDC's. Bourgeois democracy cannot long survive in such countries.

#### Imperialism and Threat of War

The main source of wars in our time is imperialism. War is imperialism's way of prosecuting by violence its policy of finding new markets, breaking competition and retaining its dominance in the countries it holds under political and economic yokes. It depends at the same time on the ever more vigorous pursuit under imperialism of the capitalist law of populations. For imperialism, war is a cure-or-kill means of saving societies from the social problems it cannot resolve.

The existence of imperialism is tantamount to perpetuation of the threat of war. A just and lasting peace is possible only in a world where socialism has achieved ultimate victory.

Peace under the conditions of capitalism is a cease-fire which the bourgeoisie tries to turn to its own advantage. It is the freezing of the spheres of influence created on the basis of war-time balances of power. Peace for imperialism is preparation for war. The more the balances change as governed by the law of unequal development, the more likely are new spheres of influence and new wars.

Imperialism is at present preparing for war in all areas, ideological, military, economic and diplomatic.

In contrast, the socialist nations are energetically agitating on many fronts to prevent the world's being drawn into a new war. This endeavor facilitates the anti-imperialist wars of the working class and the people. It limits the field of activity of imperialism's most aggressive forces.

The socialist system's counter-balance to war is a delicate balance, an imperialist backlash. The most lasting guarantee that war can be prevented is the nourishment of the world socialist system through new revolutions. An important condition in the ability to prevent wars is the internationalist education of the working class of the imperialist nations.

#### Role of Imperialism in World Backwardness

Imperialist capitalism, which has evolved into state monopolistic capitalism, slows, even prevents, the development of mankind in its unavoidable cyclical crises. The forces of production advance only slowly, wasting time in the constant struggle with private ownership, the obstacle which stands before them under capitalism.

If the obstacle to development of the forces of production, private ownership of the means of production, were removed, the workday would decline rapidly, people would be able to develop their capabilities fully as they wished and the conflict between mental and manual labor would disappear more rapidly.

Collective ownership and the collective planning of production and distribution of the means of production are necessary for the unfettered development of the forces of production.

The scientific-technological revolution is one of the most important phenomena compelling planning on a world scale, making private ownership and the states and boundaries derived from it obsolete and bringing communism closer.

The reduction in the duration and amount of labor required for collective production has been extraordinarily rapid. However, the practical result of this, because capitalism is a system based on exploitation, has been, not the reduction of the workday, but the increase of the sum of the remaining value. Despite this, the historical trend is that, through the class struggle, the workday is slowly becoming shorter, though not at the speed technological advancement would warrant.

The percentage of mental labor in the labor process is increasing rapidly. The percentage of workers in the working class engaged in mental labor is increasing. Many endeavors which used to fall outside the production process are being included in the "productive labor" concept.

Reduction of the duration and amount of labor required and the alteration of the nature of labor as a historical process is indicative of an objective impulse towards an "era of true freedom," towards communism, in which "production is accomplished with the minimum expenditure of energy" and "under human-benevolent conditions."

As a consequence of the scientific-technological revolution, the collective nature of production is increasing more rapidly and the collective basis of ownership is expanding more rapidly. The forces of production are expanding to the extent that no country, barring one or two on a continental scale, has sufficient resources for the production it needs. Development of the forces of production makes production and distribution planning imperative, not just on a national scale, but on a world scale which takes into account raw materials, energy sources and markets.

Moreover, imperialist capitalism has demonstrated its ability to take great strides in the development of the forces of production, despite its conflict-ridden and crisis-riddled structure.

The progress of the imperialist system cannot be compared with the socialism of the LDC's. The only correct measure which may be used in comparison is these nations' /own/capabilities. If socialism had been realized in the advanced capitalist nations, what level of advancement could have been achieved with their present forces of production? This question of the role of private ownership of the means of production in preventing development is one answered in the asking.

Left to itself, world capitalism has a significant reserve which it can draw upon for progress and prosperity.

If the world imperialist system is not fragmented by means of revolutions, the route imperialism takes is to expand the world market as far as it will go, approaching communism as nearly as possible. Communism steadily peers through more and more windows.

This cannot go on saving capitalism forever. Capitalism may have a long life but the basic conflict will not be resolved, but only temporarily mitigated, and it will reach the next rung on the ladder through more violence.

This is the direction history has taken. The task of the revolutionary forces is to curtail this drunken progress and translate it into conscious progress.

#### World Revolution

World revolution is the process of forming the dictatorship of the proletariat, to lead to the era of communism on a world scale.

The world revolution is, in concrete terms, the process of advancement in all areas by the Soviet Union and other socialist nations and of new nations joining the socialist collective in the revolutions realized in the weak links of the imperialist system.

World revolution cannot be reduced to development of the socialist nations existing today. There are objective constraints on placing the burden of achieving the era of communism on these nations, constraints resulting from the success of proletarian revolutions to date in the LDC's.

The world socialist system, unless nourished by new revolutions, is in danger of collapse, never mind surpassing capitalism. The imperialist system is still stronger throughout the world and, under these circumstances, socialism is in danger of collapse as long as the socialist nations, owing essentially to the legacy of less development inherited from the past, cannot provide for their own national peoples the opportunities existing in the advanced capitalist nations.

Revolutions are necessary to speed the transformation of the age and make it irreversible. The task of the socialist nations is to provide the support needed by all the revolutionary wars in the world and to advance socialism.

Doubtless, the short cut to the age of communism is realization of the revolution in the large imperialist nations.

The most important guarantee of success under present circumstances would be for the leading proletarian dictatorships to form among themselves and with the working class of other nations a solid, unshakeable bloc, because the existing proletarian dictatorships have achieved only /partial success/. When the filagree of the world's economic, social and diplomatic relations becomes a solid fabric favoring the socialist nations and the world working class, then this will be universal, not partial. This point will be arrived at, in all probability, not through the sudden or total collapse of imperialism, but through revolutions in individual countries or blocs of countries. The /world proletarian dictatorship/ which will come into existence in this process will be tantamount to the ultimate victory of socialism.

With the establishment of the world proletarian dictatorship, the age of transition from capitalism to communism will close and the /age of communism/ will open. This age, which will mark the collapse of imperialism as a system, the elimination of the economic source of the threat of war and the initiation of the inscription "to each according to his need" on the banner of humanity, will also see the disappearance of armies, arms, the instruments of oppression and the /compulsory structure of labor/. The forces of production will begin to flourish in dimensions uncomtemplated by capitalism. With the ascension of the forces of production, the egotistic obstacle of state boundaries will disappear and economic welfare will be the determining factor throughout the world. Only at this stage will the classes cease to be the foundation of the forces of production and the world achieve a classless -- oppressionless -- society, /communism/ [capitalized].

## 2. State Monopolistic Capitalism in Turkey

Turkey, under the oppression of imperialism, is a capitalist nation in a state of medium development, its industrialization incomplete and its technology obsolete. On this foundation, monopolies have grown strong, finance capital has emerged and state monopolistic capitalism has risen through collusion of the state and the monopolies. Industry is the leading sector.

### 2.1. Development Features of Turkish Capitalism

As long as it did not lead to popular revolution, it suited the Turkish bourgeoisie to drive out the imperialist invaders in the war of independence and deny its market to anyone else.



Upon defeating imperialism, the bourgeoisie chose the route of employing all the resources of the state to develop capitalism. Applying every sort of economic, social and political violence and persuasion, it promoted the accumulation of primary capital, a route which eviscerated the proletariat.

Because there was no peasant revolution to parallel the defeat of imperialism, the development of capitalism in agriculture was /evolutionary/, by way of the capitalization of the large landowners. The peasantry was left to the painful process of decomposition, wearing itself away on a tiny parcel of land.

The bourgeoisie had not severed its ties to imperialism at all. By 1950, a bourgeoisie well laden with accumulated capital had appeared in Turkey. This gros bourgeoisie and the allied large landowners had mutually embraced imperialism.

After 1950 in particular, rapid economic development took place in Turkey, but large imbalances paralleled this development. During this time, the gros bourgeoisie in cooperation with imperialism chose monopolization on the main foundation of light industry instead of heavy industry, which required high investment and would have brought belated profits, and the large landowners chose progress through mechanization and growing capitalization. This meant unbalanced development of the economy and the failure to establish the necessary ratio between heavy and light industry.

Capitalism developed in Turkey as monopolistic /from the very beginning/, without a period of free competition. Banks, in conjunction with the state and foreign capital, played the major role in the rise and development of the monopolies. For this reason, the monopolization process itself was a process of the emergence of local /finance capital/ by means of collusion between bank and industrial capital. While the banks' primary task was to speed capital accumulation, they gradually became the focus of finance capital. This process put the monopolies in the stronger position in the national economy in the 1960's and brought about the domination of finance capital in the 1970's.

Finance capital rose on a base of medium development in Turkey, that base was committed to its own interests and turned to organization along these lines. A self-sufficient mechanism spread also to the base on which finance capital rested. As a result of the steps taken at every level towards mechanization of production in Turkey, profit ceilings soon began to fall. The need arose to take counter-measures such as increasing exploitation and finding areas of profitable foreign trade and foreign investment.

This need grew in post-1970 Turkey, assuming the first connotations of an imperative. While the exploitation of the monopolies intensified, the need for externality, the imperializing process in the sense of exports of capital and goods, began to gain importance at the same time.

Since the foundation of medium development dictated that effective demand on the domestic market would be limited, the advancing branches of industry have been producing beyond the capacity of the domestic market to absorb. The greater the need for exportation, the greater the problems become. Moreover, the products of these branches of industry encounter "protectionism," "customs barriers" and

such practices on the markets they are able to penetrate. The advanced branches of industry suffer from the general backwardness and unbalanced development of the country and from dependence on imperialism as the underlying cause of all problems.

Export-oriented industrialization will continue in Turkey. Turkey already has one of the more extensive industrial complexes in the central tier. Such industrialization, however, cannot solve the country's profound problems or break the chain of less development.

The process which took place in industry, with the Prussian-type capitalization which has obtained since the 19th century, was followed in agriculture after an interval of roughly 10 years. A boom along the lines of the capitalist development of the 1950's occurred in the nation's agriculture in the 1960's. Since then, the rural areas have witnessed the rise of agricultural monopolies and an agricultural bourgeoisie at one extreme, an agricultural proletariat at the other, and an enormous mass of small producers in between. Capitalist production relationships are the rule in agriculture today.

Semi-feudal remnants remain here and there in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Capitalism, however, has taken all these relationships in stride, thus compounding their oppression.

Finance capital has plunged into agriculture also, and the monopolization of agriculture in Turkey is rather advanced. The state heads the list of agricultural monopolies through such bodies as the Propagation Farms, the Meat and Fish Association, the Soil Products Office and others.

Under the Turkish Republic, founded after the war, the Turkish bourgeoisie used the internal colony of Turkish Kurdistan to develop capitalism in Turkey. It turned to securing primary accumulations through economic and political /violence/ by means of the state. It transferred the wealth accumulated through wanton exploitation of Kurdistan to the West in the form of capital.

The people of Kurdistan suffered great harm as a result of the colonial policy pursued by the most barbaric of methods during this period, which lasted until the 1950's. Development of their power to produce ceased.

The Kurdish people revolted against this pillage and plunder and were ruthlessly put down.

A gradual capitalist development, spilling over from the rest of Turkey, gathered momentum in Kurdistan, too, in the decade between 1950 and 1960. The ethnic oppression did not diminish. Particularly in post-1970 Turkey where state monopolistic capitalism has become dominant, Kurdistan is being exploited by new methods on a new historical foundation by finance capital. The oppressive mechanisms of monopolistic capital, ramified by the underdeveloped foundation of Kurdistan, are producing even worse consequences for the Kurdish proletariat.

In addition to the familiar internal exploitation of Kurdistan, Turkish finance capital began after 1974 to add yet another colony, Northern Cyprus. The economy of the occupied zone was tightly tied to Turkey.

The occupation of Northern Cyprus is proof that the Turkish bourgeoisie has again begun to see itself as a power able to look covetously beyond its own shores.

#### State Monopolistic Capitalism in Turkey

Looking back, it is seen that historically the state has always stepped in /with its full weight/ from the very beginning during /hard times/ such as war or when the bourgeoisie is not strong enough to combat its rivals. This has been the case also for the Turkish bourgeoisie, which arrived late on the historical scene as a class, though the role of the state has changed along with the capitalist development of society.

The bourgeoisie was weak in the early years of the republic. The bourgeois state first pursued a rather liberal policy based on the 1923 Izmir Economic Congress. It took it upon itself to secure "indirectly" the conditions conducive to strengthening the bourgeoisie.

Nevertheless, the absence of adequate capital accumulation in the country and the effects of the 1929 depression left the bourgeois state obliged to participate in the economy directly, pursuing a policy of "etatism."

Etatism was abandoned as soon as it completed its task of setting in motion the capital accumulation mechanism. But the economic activity of the state did not end. The state now began to play an active role in the process of turning large amounts of capital into finance capital.

The decade from 1960 to 1970 would be marked by efforts to establish the rule of finance capital. State-run businesses increasingly appeared during this decade, both generally and in planning. Organizations emerged in which state, bank, industrial, foreign and "army" capital mixed. The clique holding the upper ranks in the army in Turkey were involved in finance capital.

As the 1970's approached, the quality of the state's role changed. This /new stage/ would be marked by the growing closeness between the monopolies and the state, the fusion of the two, and the take-over of the state by the monopolies. The power of the monopolies and the power of the state coalesced in a /single mechanism/. The state assumed the concrete task in the /process of expanded regeneration of monopolistic capital/ and became the most important part of this process.

This integration is necessary for the problems which finance capital cannot solve by itself. Expansion of the domestic market, speeding the monopolies' accumulation of capital and securing the massive exploitation of the worker and the poor -- the "solution" of these and many other problems all require the active hand of the state.

The integration of the monopolies and the state in a single mechanism is the determining factor. /State monopolistic capitalism exists/ in Turkey.

The state has been dominated by the monopolistic bourgeoisie since the 1970's.

## 2.2. Consequences of State Monopolistic Capitalism in Turkey

The formation of state monopolistic capitalism does not and cannot have the same results in Turkey as elsewhere in the West. Imperialist nations, in the past, have prevented civil war and the destruction of capitalism by means of becoming imperialistic, but this is not a valid result for Turkey.

Just to enable externality as to both goods and capital, Turkish capitalism must conform to international standards in duration, quantity, cost and quality of production. It is necessary to raise the internal level of technology to do this. This, though, means declining profit margins. To protect and raise profit aggregates despite declining profit margins again requires massive exportation. Moreover, to raise the level of technology requires plentiful credit and foreign exchange. It becomes a vicious circle.

It would be very hard, at the present stage of development of the world imperialist system, for Turkey to break this vicious circle and become imperialistic. It is able to realize the limited "capital exports" it makes behind the skirts of one or another imperialist monopoly. Turkey can be nothing but a "springboard for imperialism" in foreign investments.

Moreover, the ripe but as yet unrealized desire to "solve problems by becoming imperialistic" is a desire which, if realized, would entangle the country in an even worse maze of conflict as a sub-imperialistic nation. To perpetuate the existence of finance capital, Turkey has essentially to intensify exploitation within the country and "suppress" the accompanying sharply rising class conflicts.

A medium-developed nation where state monopolistic capitalism on a base of extremely diverse small-scale production dominates the economy, where the finance oligarchy has control of the state, where the requirements of imperialist expansionism cannot be met, and which, moreover, imperialism in collusion with local monopolies exploits in all areas and keeps under military guidance, Turkey can have no escape from the jaws of economic crises. Capitalism is at an impasse in Turkey; the existence of a situation which only revolution can resolve is structural.

With this structure, Turkey has no way out of sociopolitical crises. Such an economic structure continuously breeds totalitarian, fascist-like or fascist regimes, and the brief "democratic" intervals are nothing but pseudo-democracy, even by bourgeois standards. The fascist proclivity, too, is structural.

This is the Turkish dilemma. If we were forced to think in terms of capitalism: the demands of the economy on the one hand, the domestic market which cannot and the foreign market which will not absorb its production on the other. Either imperialist expansion or decay. Since we are not forced to think in terms of capitalism: either imperialist expansion or socialism. Socialism is necessary to overcome the obstacles to development of the forces of production in Turkey. The way to true development cannot be opened in Turkey until the bonds of imperialism and local finance capital are broken. Turkey has no rescue from being the weak link of imperialism.

The middle road in Turkey is temporary. Two roads diverge before Turkish society. Either fascism with the excessive exploitation of the people guaranteed, or revolution to mobilize the revolutionary energies of the people and resolve their problems.

### 3. Character of Turkish Revolution, Unity of People

#### 3.1. Revolutionary Stage: Advanced Democratic People's Revolution

The next stage of /social revolution/ for Turkey, a capitalist nation, is socialism.

Turkey has the physical preconditions for socialism. These preconditions find their most concrete expression in the role of the state in the economy and in state monopolistic capitalism.

#### Basic Problem of Revolution, Problem of Power

The /principal enemy/ in Turkey is the local finance oligarchy and imperialism. These are the powers to be pulled down.

The first and fundamental problem of every revolution is the problem of political power. The next step for the Turkish revolution is /political revolution/, which will, through the unified struggle of the popular classes, depose imperialism and local finance capital and change the class character of political power.

Every social revolution harbors within it a political revolution. On the other hand, some political revolutions are carried out for the purpose of leading to social revolution. These are political revolutions in the spirit of social revolution. Other political revolutions, however, simply bring about a change of political power without leading to social revolution.

Political revolution carried out under proletarian hegemony in Turkey would be a political revolution in the spirit of social revolution. However, a political revolution in which petit bourgeois radicalism seized the leadership would not be of equal profundity. Unless the proletariat takes the lead, it will backfire in the end.

Under the concrete circumstances of Turkey, the political revolution which our party calls the /advanced democratic people's revolution/ [ADPR] would be an anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly, anti-fascist, anti-colonialist revolution. As opposed to bourgeois democratic revolution, the objective logic of ADPR is to prepare the way for social revolution, leading inexorably to socialism.

The first step for the working class in social revolution is to raise the proletariat to the position of the governing class. This also means winning the struggle for democracy.



## Social Revolution a Question of True Democracy

The question of social revolution in Turkey is a question of the entrenchment of /true democracy/. The struggle for democracy has passed beyond the anti-feudal framework in Turkey. This struggle may now be engaged only within a comprehensive framework, the transition from capitalism to socialism.

Collaborationist capitalism and especially finance capitalism in Turkey have made democracy an economic and political dream for our people. On the other hand, it has raised the people's democratic hopes and needs in every area. /Democratization/ in every aspect of economic, social and political life has become a definite necessity for social development.

Capitalism can be destroyed by socio-economic revolution, not democratic transformations. However, a proletariat untrained in the struggle for democracy can neither assume the leadership of the people, develop democracy nor carry out social revolution.

The struggle to realize political revolution is a struggle to bring about true democracy for two fundamental reasons.

/First/, a successful political revolution and, /second/, the ability to establish a new state after the revolution would be proof of the active participation of the majority of the people in the revolutionary process and the affairs of state, conditions without the fulfillment of which, indeed, the two goals cannot be achieved.

The ability of political revolution to progress to social revolution depends directly on the development of democracy. Capitalism will not be destroyed without eliminating the private ownership of the means of production. Without organization of all the people for the democratic government of the means of production, without mobilization within the democratic organization of the government of the state, results fully consistent with our goals in this area cannot be achieved.

And without the development of democracy to the point of eventual demise, progress from socialism, the substage of communism, to communism cannot be achieved.

For these reasons, a working class which has not succeeded in the struggle for democracy cannot assume the leadership of the people to realize ADPR, cannot push this revolution on to social revolution, and cannot lead society to achieve the stage in which the state withers away.

## Working Class Consciousness, Organization Characterize Revolutionary Government

The program for the transformations to occur in the /first step/ of ADPR is a democratic program which does not go beyond the theoretical framework of capitalism, but surpasses its practical framework and bourgeois legality.

The ADPR program is not yet socialism for this reason, but, under the rule of a working-class hegemony, neither is it any longer capitalism, but rather a giant step towards socialism. ADPR under working-class hegemony and social revolution are two instances of a /single/ revolution in Turkey.

The consciousness of the working class, its ability to lead the masses and its level of organization will determine the class character of the ADPR political administration. That Turkey is a nation in a generation of transition heightens also the tendency of the revolution to have various possibilities.

ALPR could succeed in Turkey under the absolute sovereignty of the working class, and a dictatorship of the proletariat could be established without sharing power. The prerequisite for this would be the ability /before the revolution/ of the working class under guidance of the communist party to establish a firm alliance with the petit bourgeoisie and democratic strata and isolate the conciliatory-uncommitted elements during the period of preparation for the revolution. Such a government would be the starting point for social revolution.

If the proletariat is not strong enough to seize power but the alliances at the social level carry over to the level of political power, the government established would be a worker-petit bourgeois dictatorship, which is to say less advanced and more of a compromise. Such a government is a /transitional/ government. This government, if under proletarian hegemony, is a kind of proletarian dictatorship, and perhaps a second struggle -- but one which could be resolved only by the triumph of the proletariat -- would be the starting point for social revolution.

If the government established after the revolution is a worker-petit bourgeois dictatorship and the proletariat has failed to achieve hegemony, we cannot easily speak of a political revolution in the spirit of social revolution. This will come about only through subsequent developments, with the transformation of the government into a kind of proletarian dictatorship through strengthening the proletarian hegemony by means of regrouping the class powers in the government.

A revolution in which petit bourgeois revolutionary democracy seized power without partners could not possess the social spirit. It would be a revolution of questionable direction. It would either become a kind of proletarian dictatorship by the regrouping of class powers or relinquish its gains to the bourgeoisie.

Development of the Turkish revolution depends on proletarian hegemony.

Key to Development is Proletarian Hegemony

The revolution which takes place under the actual, not just ideological, hegemony of the proletariat is political revolution in the spirit of social revolution; proletarian dictatorship would be established. A revolution does not have to be a "pure" socialist revolution in order to be a socialist revolution. There is no such thing as a pure revolution.

Proletarian government naturally includes the alliances which the nation's realities dictate. Each state (dictatorship) is a power bloc. However, each state is the dictatorship of a /single/ class. Government by two classes combined is a /transitional/ situation.

The "worker-peasant revolutionary democratic dictatorship" which has been the goal of bourgeois democratic revolutions in the age of imperialism and the "worker-petit bourgeois dictatorship" which may emerge in the ADPR posed against finance capital and imperialism are thus /transitional/ governments.

These /transitional/ governments, if under proletarian hegemony, are also, historically, still a kind of proletarian dictatorship.

When socialist revolution takes place in the advanced capitalist nations, then the class which /directly/ establishes the state (dictatorship) will also be the majority in society for the first time in history.

Just as the proletariat, in taking power, will be able to change its alliances according to the situation of the country, it may also do so according to the world situation. At a time when socialism is much stronger worldwide, the base of the working class' alliances will expand also.

Ours is the age of transition from capitalism to communism and this transition will exhibit many different forms.

If there is no such thing as pure revolution in the world, if the world and imperialism are ripe for socialism as a whole, and if the Turkish working class seizes power within alliances dictated by the structure of the nation and world circumstances, this is political revolution in the spirit of social revolution, proletarian revolution.

There are problems in Turkey which historically require the collapse of capitalism, and they will be the lever for gaining development of the proletarian revolution and the rebellion of all the people.

Proletarian revolution in Turkey, as a medium-developed country, will represent the interests of the entire /middle class/ (petit bourgeoisie), not just the working class and rural-urban poor.

### 3.2. Class Status in Advanced Democratic People's Revolution

#### Bourgeoisie

The prime enemy of the Turkish people is the organic bond to local finance capital and imperialism. This bond is one which arises within the framework of the international capitalist division of labor and economic exigencies and is weakened by the existence of a strong working class at home and socialist system abroad.

Further, the Turkish bourgeoisie in general depends on imperialism within the international capitalist division of labor. Turkish capital (monopolist and nonmonopolist alike) is part of the expanded regeneration of imperialist finance capital. This fact underlies the relationship which we describe as "economic dependency."

Turkey's inclusion in the process of regeneration of imperialist capital brings with it many varied dependencies in the international division of labor and in the process of "international concentration of capital under the hegemony of imperialist capital." The result of this development is the transfer to imperialist capital of a portion of the remaining value held by the local bourgeoisie and, thus, the /economic foundation of the conflicts/ between this local bourgeoisie and imperialism.

The mechanism of the Turkish bourgeoisie's dependence on imperialism affects different groups of the bourgeoisie in different ways. The deeper imperialism-dependent capitalism becomes entrenched in Turkey and the farther the division of labor and integration advance both domestically and internationally, the more /internal/ conflicts of non-monopoly capital are perceived as conflicts in both internal and external monopoly capital.

This situation brings to the structure of the Turkish bourgeoisie, its internal conflicts and its relationship with imperialism a third and new dimension besides the bourgeoisie's own hierarchy of power and the relationship to imperialism consistent with this hierarchy. In that the steadily increasing compartmentalization of the bourgeoisie's internal conflicts reflects imperialist conflicts, these kinds of conflicts cause /vertical/ categorization of small-medium-large capitalists, or nonmonopoly and monopoly capitalists. Thus, the bourgeoisie in general is assuming a /heterogeneous/ structure throughout.

Monopoly capital and nonmonopoly capital are parts of the structure which monopoly capitalism dominates. The two have conflicts as well as mutual benefits. The conflicts between them arise within these beneficial relationships after the monopolies become dominant.

The stronger monopoly capitalism grows, the more dependent on monopoly capital nonmonopoly capital becomes and, while retaining intact their ownership as a matter of form, the units of production in fact become dependent on monopoly capital.

This characteristic of nonmonopoly capital eliminates any opportunity for it to resist monopoly capital as a whole and destroys its /political unity/.

The nonmonopoly bourgeoisie in Turkey /is not revolutionary/, but counter-revolutionary. The most important factors dictating the counterrevolutionary stance of the nonmonopoly bourgeoisie are the deepening of the imperialism-socialism contradiction which is a reflection of the labor-capital contradiction in the international plan, the fact that it is a part of an exploitative class in ownership of the means of production and the great energy with which the rapidly growing capitalism in Turkey is digging its own grave.

The nonmonopoly bourgeoisie in Turkey /is not democratic/. Liberalism and democracy have been made distinct from each other in Turkey. The nonmonopoly bourgeoisie represents liberalism. Its liberalism stems from its desire for elbow room vis-a-vis monopoly capital and crystallizes in the desire for a well-organized system of rules (laws, etc.) in both the economic and political spheres.

The /first/ indicator of the separation of nonmonopoly liberalism and democracy in Turkey is its love of imperialist policy. The effort to "open to foreign markets" and the occupation of Northern Cyprus are indicators of this imperialist policy.

The /second/ indicator is exemplified by how far it is from engaging any consistent warfare against the monopolies and, therefore, against fascism. The non-monopoly bourgeoisie, owing to the stage at which capitalism is in Turkey, cannot propose a consistent democratic program to combat the nation's principal enemy.

The /third/ indicator is the chauvinistic attitude towards the Kurdish people. Ethnic chauvinism is one of the most important obstacles to democracy.

The nonmonopoly bourgeoisie in Turkey /is not anti-imperialist/. The nonmonopoly bourgeoisie opposes neither the economic nor the military presence of imperialism in our country, neither NATO membership, nor U.S. bases.

To see these characteristics of the nonmonopoly bourgeoisie in Turkey is not to put it in the same bag with the monopolists. There are important distinctions between the nonmonopoly bourgeoisie and imperialism and the monopoly bourgeoisie, distinctions which play a role in sociopolitical life.

The nonmonopoly bourgeoisie is a heterogeneous group, though it has internal distinctions and conflicts. The distinction between the small and medium capitalist may explain this to an extent. The economic status of the small capitalist is more capricious and less powerful, putting him rather close, economically and psychologically, to the petit bourgeoisie.

Objectively, the position of the subsectors of the nonmonopoly bourgeoisie, of its weakest sectors economically and of the sectors least directly dependent on imperialism is more advanced relative to the other sectors.

The steadily growing dependence of the nonmonopoly bourgeoisie on monopolistic capital and the relinquishment of a portion of its remaining value to internal and external monopolies do not mean that the nonmonopoly bourgeoisie is exploited. The nonmonopoly bourgeoisie is not exploited, but rather the /exploiter/. The exploitative relationship is between the bourgeoisie as a whole and the working class plus the rural and urban petit bourgeoisie.

#### Petit Bourgeoisie

Turkey has the largest petit bourgeoisie of any society in Europe.

It is concentrated in the rural areas as well as in the cities. The large majority of the bureaucracy and academia comes under the scope of the petit bourgeoisie.

The base on which finance capital rests strives to shape the widespread small and medium production [units] to fit its interests. On the one hand, the traditional petit bourgeoisie is rapidly diminishing and becoming proletarianized. This is causing violent reactions in this sector. On the other hand, this diminishing



traditional petit bourgeoisie is being replaced, with its replacement being organized within the finance capital network. For example, tailors and cobblers are disappearing, while the "auxiliary industrialist" rises.

This two-pronged effect creates very confusing and conflicting processes within the petit bourgeoisie. However, the impact of the monopolistic bourgeoisie on this class generally is very severe and stifling.

The segment of the bureaucracy and intellectuals falling into this class is the most active segment of the petit bourgeoisie and the one closest to the working class.

The petit bourgeoisie is an interim class. It is always vulnerable to bourgeois influences. It is inherently affected by ideological bombardment and political pressures. However, all bourgeois governments savage the economic and democratic rights of this class, impoverishing it. The monopolistic bourgeoisie has no choice but to further deprive the petit bourgeoisie and this determines the potential power of the petit bourgeoisie.

#### Working Class

The working class, the true generator of all wealth, is one of the two fundamental classes of capitalism. It is growing in Turkey in proportion to the development of capitalism, and its impact on society is incalculable owing to the place it holds in production.

It has not taken very long since the factory stage for the working class in Turkey to become a "class in its own right." Since the early 1960's, it has grown in numbers nationwide, it has become stronger, established strong organizations and launched an extensive, militant struggle. The Turkish working class was a "class in its own right" by the 1970's. Its struggle has become political. Its struggle is the class struggle.

#### Why 'Advanced Democratic,' Why 'People's Revolution'

The characteristics which make our revolution "advanced democratic" go beyond those discussed thus far.

Democratic revolution is in substance bourgeois revolution. "At the heart of bourgeois democratic revolution is the purging of the nation's social relationships (systems, institutions) of feudalism." Advanced democratic revolution, however, has no one single task such as clearing away the obstacles to capitalism. It is opposed to finance capital.

Capitalism is advanced in comparison to feudalism as monopolistic capitalism is to free competition capitalism. A revolution against the finance oligarchy, if it does not progress towards socialism under proletarian hegemony, but enters on a route that serves the business of the nonmonopoly bourgeoisie or the petit bourgeoisie in cooperation with it directly or indirectly, is in the final analysis reactionary.

Democratic revolution objectively serves the interests of the moyen bourgeoisie, and especially the rural bourgeoisie. Advanced democratic revolution has no such function.

These things show the more /advanced/ content of advanced democratic revolution.

The characteristics which make our revolution a true /"people's"/ revolution go beyond those mentioned thus far also:

The crux of ADPR is the dismantling of the bourgeois state apparatus at the political revolution stage. Under the conditions of capitalism, /dismantling/ the bureaucratic-militaristic apparatus of the bourgeoisie is the /primary condition/ of all true people's revolutions.

### 3.3. Unity of People in ADPR

Unity of the forces of revolution is of crucial importance for the Turkish revolutionary movement. It is the duty of the communists to grasp fundamentally the need for the Turkish revolutionary forces to establish unity of purpose, evaluate their potential for doing so and strive for this end.

Unity of the people cannot be established without inculcation of the militant rank and file with the understanding of true unity.

#### Nonmonopoly Bourgeoisie

The nonmonopoly bourgeoisie in Turkey /is not a revolutionary, democratic, anti-imperialistic, anti-monopolistic, truly anti-fascist force/. It is an exploitative class, is not among the popular classes and opposes revolution. The more violent the agitation of the popular classes becomes, the larger and more active will be the portion of this sector joining the counterrevolutionary ranks.

When class warfare approaches the moment of denouement, a situation indicative of the outcome occurs within the ruling class, indeed within the entire former society from top to bottom, in that a small portion of the ruling class severs its ties with its class and joins the class which holds the future in its hands. This historic rule is true for Turkey as well. As the nation draws nearer the moment of revolution, the majority of the nonmonopoly bourgeoisie and the effective political forces will take a more active position in the counterrevolutionary ranks, while a small portion will join the ranks of the people. This fact neither changes the general rule nor requires communists to impose their policies on this sector.

At specific points in the struggle against imperialism and monopolies, /limited/ and /temporary/ compromises may be made with the bourgeoisie to the extent and in the form dictated by circumstances. In advanced democratic people's revolution leading to socialism, communists cannot reject compromise which is to the detriment of the principal enemy and to the benefit, albeit small, albeit temporary, of the working class. However, such compromises have no meaning within the "anti-monopoly, anti-imperialist" alliance.

The /first/ and fundamental aspect of communist tactics against the nonmonopoly bourgeoisie is /to isolate/ it from the popular classes. The /second/ aspect is /to sever its support/ from the monopolistic bourgeoisie and imperialism, the principal enemy. It is to strive to take advantage of even the slightest, most transitory conflicts within the bourgeoisie to prevent the nonmonopoly bourgeoisie from being put in the same pigeon-hole with the principal enemy.

#### Petit Bourgeoisie

The petit bourgeoisie is a fundamental problem of our revolution. The working class cannot carry out the revolution unless it wins over the petit bourgeoisie.

The rural and urban petit bourgeoisie in Turkey (which includes the majority of the Kurdish people), objectively, favors a democracy in which the popular classes are free to organize. It favors the right of self-determination of peoples. Its democratic-ness is rooted in its being an oppressed and exploited class.

The petit bourgeoisie in Turkey is objectively opposed to the policy of imperialism and the presence in our country of imperialism, monopolies and fascism. It is capable of implementing a revolutionary program under proletarian leadership.

For the Turkish revolution, we will combine the Kurdish people and the urban and rural petit bourgeoisie with their revolutionary potential under the banner of the working class. To do this, breaking the hold of bourgeois influences on the broad masses of petit bourgeoisie is of importance in determining the outcome.

Temporary and limited compromises with the political representatives of petit bourgeois democracy and unity of action to guard its ideological and organizational independence are fundamental to our party's stance.

#### Semi-Proletarians

Semi-proletarians comprise a significant portion of the population in Turkey. This sector is the proletariat's closest ally and most reliable support not just in ADPR, but in the process of social revolution.

To rally the semi-proletarians under the banner of the working class is an essential task of the revolution.

#### Working Class

The Turkish working class, including agricultural workers, is the ideological, organizational, actual and military vanguard of the revolution. National circumstances make this possible and necessary.

There is in Turkey a strong working class which has led revolutionary wars and is capable of putting its stamp on social development.

Finance oligarchy and its state are one with imperialism and exploit the entire nation. Posed against it is the industrial proletariat, whose task is to defend the rights of /all the oppressed/, show them the way to liberation and direct joint warfare for liberation. It carries the standard of social development against imperialism and the monopolistic-collaborationist bourgeoisie.

The Turkish proletariat cannot perform its historic task by defending its own rights alone or stand idly by watching the disenfranchisement, oppression, exploitation and tyranny taking place around it. Were it to do so, it would destroy its own justification and authenticity. Its historic strength comes from its being the archenemy of all types of oppression, suppression and exploitation. It can be strong if it ranges itself against finance capital, which is the focus of the entire network of oppression, but only if it does so as the enemy of that network in its entirety. The conceptualization and performance of this crucial task by the working class is tantamount to establishing proletarian hegemony in the process of revolution.

### Working Class Hegemony and Unity

We communists see true unity of the working class as the strengthening of its party, which operates on a foundation of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. We say that true political unity of the working class takes place in the party of the working class, the communist party, and within the framework of its class policy.

What prompts the requirement of hegemony as regards the proletariat is the existence of other oppressed classes besides itself and the need to march on the common enemy.

Proletarian hegemony is working class imposition of its will on the other classes and strata. This will come about by means of the working class party and the organizations which it embraces.

The most important means of ensuring working class hegemony is to impress the TCP and its way of warfare upon the broad masses insofar as possible.

It is necessary that the working class attain hegemony; that, in order to lead the masses, it be able to demonstrate to them the /irrelevance/ of the existing powers with which they have been working, or not working, together; and be able to /distinguish/ itself.

The problem is to ensure that the masses turn to the true class struggle by demonstrating to them the inadequacy of their allies and, at the same time, to advance the revolution.

The manner in which hegemony is attained and the manner and means by which it is put into practice will vary according to the circumstances. Whatever the circumstances, however, hegemony will emerge within the struggle between the existing organizations over policy on behalf of the various classes and strata.

No conflict can exist between hegemony and unity. Quite to the contrary, the foremost condition for a successful unity is that the working class be strong enough to head those who may be its allies. Strong unity cannot be established without, in fact, being strong enough to ensure hegemony.

Social democracy and opportunism are the most significant obstacles to unity of the working class and the people.

Social democracy is bourgeois ideology striving to penetrate the working population. It is a fad which tries to prevent revolutionary explosions by way of reforms, trying to superimpose itself on capitalism.

Bourgeois liberalism is the fundamental link binding the popular masses to the principal enemy, the monopolistic bourgeoisie. We cannot win the masses over to revolutionary struggle without eliminating this influence towards inertia.

The most important obstacle to winning the working class over to communism is the opportunism which blurs the distinction between communism and social democracy. For this reason, warfare against bourgeois ideology cannot be separated from warfare against opportunism.

Defeating opportunism in the revolutionary ranks would be the heaviest blow inflicted upon "leftism" which is, in a sense, the wages of opportunist sins.

The struggle with opportunism is not a struggle to discard mass policy, but to put it on a realistic foundation. The struggle with opportunism for working class unity and the broader unity of all people is a task which cannot be deferred.

#### 4. Popular Struggle Against Monopolies and ADPR Program

##### 4.1. Working Class Economic Warfare

##### Turkish Working Class' Economic Struggle Being Politicized

Owing on the one hand to state-monopoly integration in Turkey and, on the other, to the tendency of finance capital to "use force" in general, the process of /objective/ politicization of economic struggles has gained momentum. This situation facilitates the better understanding by our working class of the integral nature of economic-political warfare.

Under state monopolistic capitalism, the state in Turkey is party in all labor-management relationships of direct concern to the worker, such as wages, collective agreements, social security and severance pay. Any kind of economic-union demand mounted to any definite extent by those who work is in /direct/ opposition to the state. This is politicization of economic warfare. Political warfare is class warfare.

Our working class is a borderless colony under despotism. It is deprived of the most fundamental economic and union rights. The extent of its exploitation is far greater than exploitation in the advanced capitalist nations.

The capitalist rule of "relative deterioration" in the status of the working class is obviously at work in Turkey.

The capitalist rule of "absolute deterioration" in the status of the working class is also at work in Turkey.

There is a broad gap between wages and the value of labor in Turkey.



The official minimum wage is much lower than the value of unskilled labor, resulting in holding all wages down. Moreover, the official minimum wage does not apply to broad sectors. From this standpoint, the minimum wage is a focus for agitation for both universal application and having it set at a level commensurate with the value of unskilled labor.

In addition, the average wage in our country is not as yet as high as the value of unskilled labor (the level the minimum wage is supposed to be).

Working conditions of our working class are as bad as the wages it receives. Turkey has one of the highest on-the-job accident rates in the world.

A large number of workers who should have insurance coverage work off the record, without insurance. Their situation is even worse.

There are millions of unemployed who cannot even get work off the record. Unemployment is both reflected in low wages and causes even those low wages to indicate a higher standard of living for our working class than it has.

Fighting for economic-union rights is of great importance to the well-being, livelihood and future of our working class. Fighting for these rights is a powerful means of drawing the impoverished segments of the class into the struggle.

The communists must show the unions goals consistent with the level of sophistication achieved by capitalism and the class struggle as the goals of their struggle. They cannot keep their demands within the bounds acceptable to the bourgeoisie.

Realistic demands are bounded neither by what the bourgeoisie is able to grant nor by what the working class is able to take at any given time. They are demands consistent with the interests of /social development/.

Realistic demands depend most directly on revolutionary warfare, because during economic and social crisis the way to attain the needs which capitalism ought to supply is revolution.

Communists must explain that the lasting fulfillment of needs cannot be attained without dismantling tyranny. They must make all economic, union and democratic demands the major task of the day.

#### Duties, Immediate Demands of Union Movement

These are the basic duties and immediate demands of the revolutionary union movement under circumstances in which the importance of economic warfare is steadily growing:

1. Struggle, revolutionary propaganda and agitation in order to discredit the legalist, pacifist, unionistic illusions which yellow and pink unionism arouse in the consciousness of the working class.
2. Disseminate concept of realistic demands.

3. a) The demand for an increased wage has no limit beyond a /minimum wage set to conform to the interests of social development/. Attention is to be drawn to the principle that wages must not lag behind price and productivity increases. However, to allow wage increase demands to stop here would be to erect a wall between the economic and political warfare of the working class, the struggle to reduce exploitation and the struggle to eliminate it.
- b) The value of unskilled labor (what the minimum wage is supposed to be) is to be taken as the common base in all wage demands.
- c) This common base will be adjusted according to price increases at suitable intervals.
- d) Wage demands will be set by adding differentials for competency and number of dependents to this common base.
- e) Wage demands will be on a net basis.
- f) One will be paid at least his standard wage for annual leave and holidays.
- g) Rights such as fuel supplements and bonuses will be paid in addition to wages.
- 5 [as published]. The work day will be limited to 8 hours; 6 hours in jobs which are dangerous and hazardous to health.
6. Weekends will be a full 48 hours.
7. Overtime in its present form will be eliminated and will be put on a voluntary basis at double pay.
8. /Factory committees/ will be elected at a joint meeting of all workers employed at a factory to deal with matters such as working conditions, worker health, arbitrary layoffs, worker abuse and unequal treatment of male and female workers. They will participate in management and be authorized to penalize the employer.
9. General unemployment insurance to include agriculture and the fisheries will be established by means of a special tax imposed on employers.
10. Employer debts to SSK [Social Insurance Organization] will be paid immediately. In addition, free health services will be introduced through a special tax to be imposed on employers.
11. Unemployment insurance and SSK will be under worker management.
12. Child labor in its present form will be prohibited. Families whose children must work for the family livelihood will be covered by juvenile insurance from a fund to be established by means of a special tax to be imposed on employers. Teachers elected publicly in each region must manage the juvenile insurance.

13. /Auditor committees/ will be formed, composed of workers and wage-earners, at all large businesses and banks to prevent tax evasion and the carry-over of taxes to prices. These committees will investigate and publicly announce incidents of tax evasion.

14. /Distribution committees/ to be composed of male and female workers will handle the distribution of scarce items. The distribution committees will at the same time investigate and publicly announce incidents of speculative hoarding.

15. All employees will be granted the right to strike and full union rights negotiated collectively; the lockout will be prohibited.

16. Unions and workers committees will have powers of oversight over all operations of businesses.

ADPR will accomplish all of these immediate demands in the first step.

#### Communist Stance on Unions

Communists advocate organizational independence of the unions and political guidance by the party.

Communists desire internal union democracy, member input and decision-making in the unions and self-discipline within organizations. They oppose political discrimination in the unions.

Communists oppose eradication of the boundaries between union and party, either the assumption of party duties by the unions or the assumption of union duties by the party. Such attitudes weaken both the unions and the party.

Unions are class organizations. Communists recognize that the unions will adopt their views sooner or later, believe that the future belongs to their thought and do not divide the unions, but conduct continuous and orthodox Marxist propaganda.

Communists respect union unity. They favor large unions, though recognizing that subdivision of the unions will continue under the circumstances of capitalism.

Communists favor union unity. However, they oppose elimination of the unions' freedom of choice and the compulsory mergers now being attempted.

Our party is active in union work regardless of who the union leaders are.

#### 4.2. Youth

The youth are the future of our people. More than half of our national population consists of youths under 20 years old. The percentage of all youth is even higher. The large majority of our youth comes from the popular classes.

Turkish youth have revolutionary traditions and, owing to this quality, have an important place in the struggle for revolution.

The severe oppression of the working class is multiplied many times over among the young sectors of the class. The exploitation of child labor is widespread. Young workers are deprived of all union rights and are excluded from minimum wage, insurance and such practices. Under the guise of apprenticeship, they are deprived of legal safeguards against on-the-job accidents and dismissal and they work for the lowest wages and under the worst conditions. Being beaten, cursed and forced to work without pay are routine. This state of affairs of young workers, most of whom work in small industrial units, suits the interests of the monopolies. Youth "are being trained" in these small businesses, most of which produce for the monopolies anyway, for future employment at monopoly factories.

Because our working class is young as a class, it has no deep class tradition to pass on from one generation to the next. The industries and workshops where youth labor is largely employed are local, small operational units. Despite these negative aspects, labor youth have mounted the struggle for basic democratic demands throughout Turkey and have adopted the ideas of socialism, proof that labor youth are the guarantee of the future.

Attacks on the higher educated youth, who have an activist tradition against imperialism and fascism, increase in proportion to the growing reactionism of the bourgeois state. Student youth is one of the worst oppressed areas.

Our youth have no right to organize and no democratic rights. The universities are not autonomous. Increasingly conservative curricula are put into practice by political administrations.

The political goals of the reactionary powers vis-a-vis student youth are these:

To train a select cadre to propagandize reactionary bourgeois ideology; to train nonpoliticized cadres versed in technical, administrative and such fields; to bring the content of what is taught and the field in which it is practiced into conformity with the needs of finance capital, which is in the imperializing process.

The bourgeoisie, in forming institutions of higher learning, pursues the additional goals of preventing students from achieving mass power; preventing interaction which may occur between the students and the local people by means of campus activities; making it easier to contain possible student incidents remote from population centers; devising universities which offer instruction at different levels of knowledge to establish a hierarchy of degrees in conformity with the hierarchical structure of production.

The struggle of student youth for democratic-academic rights is inextricably bound to the struggle of the working class for democracy. The youth movement is, in fact, an important and meaningful force only under the revolutionary leadership of the working class.

Subordinating the youth struggle to the working class struggle is possible only under the guidance of the communist party.

1. Young workers will be ensured the right to an 8-hour workday, insurance coverage and to join a union.
2. Young workers shall be given equal pay for equal work.
3. Young workers shall be ensured the right to paid leave for educational purposes.
4. Education shall be purged of reactionary content and reorganized in line with the needs of social development. Youth shall participate in educational planning.
5. Universities shall be granted full autonomy; student youth shall participate in the administration of educational units.
6. Close ties shall be established between educational units and the local people and educational units shall actively engage in social and cultural life.
7. Education and industrial production shall coalesce.
8. Free education shall be available at all levels; scholarships shall be widely used.
9. The goal in the first step shall be universal middle-level education.
10. All hindrances to active participation by youth in political life shall be lifted.
11. The organization of youth at every level en route to social development shall be fully supported by the state.
12. The voting age shall be reduced to 18 years of age.
13. Youth representatives shall sit on public bodies.

ADPR will accomplish all of these immediate needs in the first step.

#### 4.3. Women

Class stratification and the rise of private property and the state have made it the fate of women to be oppressed.

Women are "second class" citizens in every area of society in Turkey. Women are confronted by inequality, injustice and oppression everywhere, on the job, in the home, at school and before the law.

The ability to avoid paying the bourgeois female worker equal pay for equal work is used as a means of lowering the overall wage level.

The entry of women into the production process is objectively a positive development. They come directly face to face with the capitalists and learn through experience that the way to liberation is through struggle in conjunction with



their sisters of other classes. They organize in the unions and see the state and the boss together in opposition to them. They comprehend that the state is what it is. Working women are undergoing a rapid awakening.

The female worker is in the vanguard of all working women. The way to achieve unity in the women's movement is through unity of worker, petit bourgeois, Turkish and Kurdish women.

A revolution in which women do not participate cannot be won.

Women have problems and needs unique to class societies which stem not just from being workers and proletarians, but from being women as well. These individualized needs do not conflict with the needs of the working class, but on the contrary add dimension to the needs of the working class.

The advanced democratic people's revolution will be an important step in the solution of women's problems:

1. Women shall have full equality before the law; laws which degrade women such as in divorce proceedings, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children and adultery shall be abolished; and civil law shall be rewritten under this concept.
2. The equality of men and women, equal opportunity and equal pay for equal work shall be guaranteed in all areas of economic, cultural, social and political life.
3. The state and the workplace shall make provision for the mother with children, providing free day care, playgrounds, restrooms and laundry and dining facilities.
4. Women shall be given paid maternity leave during pregnancy and postpartum.
5. Any job classification degrading to women shall be prohibited.
6. All barriers to the active participation of women in political life shall be lifted.
7. The organization of women at all levels shall have the full support of the state.

The way to fundamental women's liberation is through elimination of the private ownership of the means of production. Socialism, by providing for the transition to a large scale collective economy, will release women from the slavery of housework and lead to their true and full liberation.

However, women cannot be fully liberated without overcoming the narrow framework of bourgeois roles, that is, without breaking the bond of sex roles. Women will not be fully liberated until the arrival of communism when the division of labor will disappear. Moreover, unless women have full liberty, neither can the proletariat gain full liberty.

True women's liberation occurs under communism.

#### 4.4. Small Producers Cooperative Movement

There are cooperatives founded by the rural and urban petit bourgeoisie which we may see as organizations for the protection of the small producer. These cooperatives serve, on the one hand, to attain a better economic position vis-a-vis the monopolies, but in an economy dominated by finance capital, serve the interests of the monopolies on the other. Objectively, the small producer forms the base of the monopolies.

There are, in addition, cooperatives formed directly by the state, indirectly by finance capital or the nonmonopoly bourgeoisie. Such cooperatives are also pawned off as organizations to protect the rights of the small producer. In fact, the monopolies and the state, which head these organizations, help the rich become richer by binding the small producers to themselves and appropriating for themselves the results of productivity increases in production. The agricultural industries in which many small producers have invested jointly with the monopolies serve the same purpose.

Aware of the double objective of the small producer's economic organizations, communists conduct intensive revolutionary agitation and propaganda there. Through concrete examples and tireless application, they show that the small producers can be liberated only through an antimonopoly revolution under the leadership of the working class.

With ADPR, the state shall use every means to encourage producer and consumer cooperatives, objectively divested of capitalism-serving functions, ensuring that no producer is without a cooperative. It shall erase their debts to the monopolies and the state and shall lift the heavy tax burden. The marketing of the small producer's goods shall be under state guarantee.

#### 4.5. Ethnic Problem: Two Peoples in One State

The existence of ethnic discrimination and oppressed peoples clouds the issue of the labor-capital conflict, making it easier to conceal and stirring hostility between peoples. The democratic solution of the ethnic problem is the only way to eliminate ethnic hostilities. Respect for the right of self determination of peoples is imperative for the democratization of society.

Communists are ruthless enemies of all kinds of ethnic inequality, ethnic suppression and discrimination. Communists consider the internationalist education of the proletariat of the oppressor nation an essential duty to combat the chauvinism of the oppressor nation. Communists also oppose all ethnic narrow-mindedness on the part of the oppressed.

In the ethnic problem, communists do not go looking for trouble where none exists, but struggle to resolve the problems with which historical development has presented them in a way consonant with the interests of the proletariat.

#### Ethnic Problem in Turkey is Kurdish Problem

The ethnic problem in Turkey today is the Kurdish problem. The Kurds are an oppressed people within the Turkish state boundaries. Turkish Kurdistan is an area which the Turks added to their national boundaries by use of force, whose

wealth they, together with the Kurdish ruling class, are exploiting ever more rapidly; Turkish Kurdistan is Turkey's internal colony. The Kurdish problem is a key problem in the Turkish revolution.

The communist tenet in the ethnic problem is the right of "the self-determination of peoples." Implicit in this right is the right of /separation/, the right to form a separate state. The Turkish Communist Party has endorsed unconditionally the right of the Kurdish people to separation, designating this as the binding stance for communists.

Defending the right of peoples to have the freedom of self-determination, the right of separation, does not mean defending separation. The other side of the right of separation is freedom to unite. In practice, supporting the establishment of a separate state is defined within the framework of the interests of the socialist revolution and of proletarian dictatorship.

Communists in general desire not the partition of peoples into small nationalistic states, but their voluntary unity in a spirit of brotherhood, free from any kind of ethnic pressure.

As communists, we desire not separation, but unity, free unity in the Kurdish problem. It is for exactly this reason that we unconditionally defend the "right of separation." We recognize that where there is no freedom to be separate, there can be no question of freedom to unite.

The task of Kurdish communists is to defend the freedom of the Kurdish people to unite with other peoples and the unity of the working class of all nations; it is to struggle against nationalism and ethnic narrowmindedness of the oppressed. These are duties demanded by proletarian internationalism.

The right of separation, and the freedom to unite, may come about only in a fully democratic climate. The Kurdish people cannot freely determine their own destiny unless the power of finance capital in Turkey is dismantled.

The working class cannot conduct revolution in Turkey without gaining the alliance of the Kurdish national-democratic powers. A Kurdish movement which does not join the struggle against the common enemy under working class hegemony, but fights a separate war, cannot win freedom. The enemy is a common enemy. The only choice is to combine forces in a single revolutionary movement.

The way to resolve the Kurdish problem is through the triumph of advanced democratic people's revolution in Turkey.

As for the final and true solution to the ethnic problem, that is possible only under the conditions of socialism.

#### War Against Occupation and Colonization of Cyprus

As the communist party of the occupying-colonialistic nation, our party defends the right to self-determination of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It believes that our working class, in order to carry revolution through to success in

Turkey, is obliged to raise the internationalist voice against the occupation and colonization of Northern Cyprus by its "own" bourgeoisie.

Our party, in return for the Greek Cypriot hostility fanned by bourgeois nationalism, exhibits internationalist solidarity to the Greek Cypriot people. It desires the revolutionary solidarity of the Greek Cypriot working class, because the way for Greek Cypriots to realize their full rights is largely through the revolution in Turkey.

As the working class of the occupying-colonialistic nation, the Turkish working class must offer concrete support to the struggle of the working class and people of occupied Northern Cyprus against the occupiers. Close organizational ties and relationships must be developed with the working class and the people of Northern Cyprus who stand directly face to face with Turkish finance capital. Notice must be given that the enemy is a common enemy and close coordination must be ensured in the common struggle.

#### Struggle for Rights of Armenian Ethnic Minority

The genocide carried out by Turkish chauvinists in Turkish Armenia is one of the most barbaric episodes in history. Turkish chauvinistic governments have stained their hands with the blood of millions of Armenians and expropriated their property. Those who escaped with their lives were forced to abandon the land where they had lived for centuries and go into exile around the globe.

Compulsory Islamization and Turkification are the unchanging foundation of the Turkish occupation of Western Armenia. The churches, schools and historic structures comprising the heritage of Armenian culture have been razed. All placenames have been changed into Turkish. Even the term "Turkish Armenia" is violently forbidden. Finance capital denies the Armenians their most fundamental right of living on their own land, forcing them to live in exile.

Our party openly condemns the Armenian genocide and subsequent diaspora. The Armenian diaspora must end, the right of the Armenians forced to abandon their lands to return freely to these lands must be recognized and the state must offer every assistance to those wishing to return. All democratic rights of the Armenians must be recognized.

It is the duty of communists to defend the rights of the Armenian ethnic minority. Advanced democratic people's revolution leading to socialism will revitalize the rights of the Armenians.

#### 4.6. Towards Peaceful Independent Foreign Policy

The struggle for peace is a democratic struggle aimed at preventing another world war. It is an anti-imperialist struggle in that it is a struggle against the aggression of imperialism and its arming with nuclear weapons powerful enough to destroy the world.

The struggle for peace, being conducted to pose a barrier to the adventurist policy of imperialism and to protect the future of the world's people, is an internationalist struggle.

The fight in our country against the ruling monopolistic bourgeoisie goes hand in hand with the fight against imperialism. The state's instruments of oppression are bound to defend the interests of the imperialist system as a whole. The fight against the militaristic bond, only one component of this system, is at the same time a general democratic struggle preparing the masses for advanced democratic people's revolutionary warfare to destroy the system in our country. The link between the struggle for peace and the struggle for revolution is plainer and more concrete in the stormy political climate in our country than in the bourgeois democracies.

To link the desire of the masses for peace with the goal of revolution and to demonstrate that a lasting peace can be achieved only through the triumph of world revolution is the task of the communists.

The expansionist tendency beginning to dominate state policies in Turkey, a nation in transition, raises the importance of having proper direction in the struggle for peace, which is one focus of the general democratic struggle.

The communist program for peace is:

1. To expose the demagoguery of the bourgeoisie, the social chauvinists and the social pacifists.
2. To oppose territorial annexation and strive for acceptance of all rights, including the right of separation, of peoples.
3. To seek true democratic and lasting peace through revolutions.

This is the program for peace in our time. This program may be defended by different methods and different forms of struggle under different circumstances, but the substance of it will not change.

The thrust of our foreign policy after the revolution will be to offer active assistance in proportion to our strength to the world revolution and to struggle for world peace. The NATO relationship and all similar ones which bind our country to imperialism will be severed, and a peaceful, independent foreign policy will be pursued. On the other hand, communists are not opposed to just wars.

#### 4.7. Advanced Democratic Constitution

Democracy is a form of government. It specifies official recognition of the equality of the citizens and holds that everyone has an equal right in determining the structure of the government and in the performance of government. On the other hand, like all governments, it represents the organized, systematic use of force against individuals.

The more democracy tends to become true democracy, reflecting in an on-going way the will of the people, it begins all the more to dynamite the foundation of capitalism. For this reason, the only and true possessor of democracy in Turkey is the working class.



Democracy brings together the proletariat struggling against capitalism and renders it capable of dismantling the bourgeois state apparatus and replacing it with a democratic state apparatus.

/This/ level of democracy is indicative of transcending the bounds of bourgeois society and initiating the communist reorganization of society.

The principal characteristic of the proletarian state is mass democracy based on the active, organized power of the masses. This is true democracy.

Democracy is not a synonym for socialism. However, true democracy cannot be achieved without revolution leading to socialism. The break in the relationship between production and politics in bourgeois society can be repaired only by eradication of the capitalist structure. For this reason, in just the same way that the question of revolution is the question of democracy, democracy is first of all a question of revolution. This is a matter of a truly democratic constitution, of a truly democratic state.

The constitution is the organization chart of the state. Persuading the people to adopt the goals of the democratic constitution depends /directly/ on eliminating tyranny and conducting revolution.

#### Democracy in Organization of State Apparatus

- a) A comprehensive central authority shall be created and its local organs shall have broad autonomy. The resources, personnel, etc. for this autonomy shall be guaranteed.
- b) All state employees (executive, judiciary, educational) shall be elected and the electorate shall have the right of recall at any time.
- c) The salary of the highest civil servant shall not exceed the salary of the skilled worker.
- d) The people shall have representatives in the courts and the system of trial by jury shall be instituted.
- e) The army shall be dispersed and a new people's army formed. Measures shall be taken to prevent the new people's army from becoming isolated from the populace or a force exclusive of the people.
- f) The people's militia shall be organized in such a manner as to make the universal right to bear arms a reality. Arms production and distribution shall be under the purview and oversight of the proletariat. All armories shall be turned over to the guardianship of worker collectives, and worker collectives at factories and businesses shall have high-powered modern weapons.
- g) The concept of an official language shall be eliminated and everyone shall have the right to speak, publish and be educated in his own language.
- h) Important decisions of concern to the nation as a whole shall be submitted to public referendum.
- i) The principle of openness in government shall be guaranteed.

## Democracy in Organization of Political System

a) Acceptance of multiparty system: The TCP accepts the multiparty system in advanced democratic people's democracy and socialism owing to the existence of various classes and strata and since there may even be different approaches within the same class.

Acceptance of the multiparty system gives the class struggle a broader, more open form. It will bring the masses further into this struggle and weaken the impact of the alienated classes towards deformation of the communist party.

Communists have no fear of the existence of other parties because they recognize that the interests of the working class and employed people are best defended by the communist party. Moreover, the single party system is not a compulsory feature of socialism.

b) As a natural consequence of the multiparty system:

1. The freedom to form parties without requiring acceptance of the communist party program shall be introduced and all parties /which do not oppose the democratic order/ of the revolutionary state shall be granted the right to operate freely.

2. Each party shall have press and television coverage in proportion to the support it gains in society.

3. During elections full respect for the will of the people shall be shown on the basis of different parties having different programs.

c) The electoral system shall be a direct election system including the principles of the right to an equal universal vote (including prisoners and those under arms), proportional representation based on the party system, the secret ballot, public enumeration and the right of recall at any time.

d) Concrete incentives shall be developed for the development of civilian society. For example, the state shall offer monetary assistance to associations, providing a place to meet and the opportunity to issue publications.

e) Democracy means a constant process of decision-making. In order to provide the opportunity for the free debate of all matters in society and to make it possible for minority views to become majority views, all views having a specific degree of support shall be granted the right to print and distribute their views through state publishing houses.

f) /Openness/ in social and political life shall be guaranteed.

g) The sanctity of the individual and his dwelling, the principle of privacy and the family unit shall be guaranteed.

h) The concept of political crimes shall be eliminated.

i) The death penalty and all penalties not consistent with human dignity shall be abolished, and torture shall be prohibited.

j) The freedom of thought, speech and assembly shall be guaranteed.

k) The freedom to travel and live within the country and abroad shall be guaranteed.

l) Freedom of individual and institutional religious belief and worship shall be guaranteed.

Our party desires that the state designate religion as an individual question. By religion's being an individual question from the standpoint of the state is meant that the state is a secular state.

There shall be no discrimination among citizens owing to religious beliefs. There shall be no reference to citizens' religion in official documents.

#### Democracy in International Relations

a) All international agreements which deny or restrict the sovereignty of the people shall be abrogated and membership in organizations of this nature shall be withdrawn.

b) Agreements to be signed and organizations to be joined on behalf of the working class and the people after the revolution shall become binding upon submission to public referendum, and their resubmission to public referendum at designated intervals shall therefore ensure the absence of "secret" agreements.

#### 4.8. General Economic Measures

Local and foreign banks shall be nationalized. Deposit holders shall not suffer the loss of a single kurush [lowest denomination of Turkish currency] in the nationalization of the banks.

2. All local and foreign monopolies shall be nationalized in due course.

3. Insurance, whole sale trade, foreign trade, minerals and the mineral extraction industry and the energy production industry shall be nationalized.

4. All communications and transportation shall be centralized step by step under the state.

5. Private ownership of all land shall be abolished, large capitalist farms shall be run by the state and the remaining land shall be distributed to the agricultural proletariat and agricultural collectives by the right of use in proportion to need.

6. Workplace democracy: Provision shall be made for the participation of workers and worker collectives in management and oversight at all workplaces.

7. The gradual increase of the authority and responsibilities of the unions in the organization and oversight of the economy shall be guaranteed.
9. Economic enterprises and machinery in the hands of the state shall be increased and uncultivated lands shall be opened to production under a predesignated plan.
10. The graduated income tax and indirect taxes shall be reduced.
11. Inheritance rights shall be restricted and later eliminated.
12. Work shall be compulsory for everyone except the disabled and retired.
13. Commercial secrecy shall be abolished.
14. Payment by check and credit card shall be expanded and shall become compulsory by law, for the wealthy in particular.
15. All property of those who rebel against the democratic order of the revolutionary state shall be confiscated.
16. Rapid and widespread provision shall be made for credit opportunities under the terms most suitable to the small producer.
17. Agriculture and industry shall be integrated under a predesignated plan.
18. Provision shall be made over time for the more balanced distribution of the population within the country in conformity with the needs of social development.
19. Comprehensive statistics concerning the economic situation shall be published regularly.

#### 4.9. Logic of Struggle for Democracy, ADPR

The Communist Party sees the struggle for democracy as /dependent/ upon the struggle for revolution. It advances democratic goals, always bearing in mind the goal of revolution which is its principal purpose.

Under capitalism, it is the fate of /all/ of the important needs of social democracy not to be applied or to be applied inadequately. Rather than take this fact as the point of departure and limit their democratic demands to the level which the capitalist order can fulfill, communists see this fact as the concrete base on which the struggle for democracy /is made dependent/ upon the goal of revolution. They advance their democratic demands not as reformist, but as revolutionary, / subversive of bourgeois notions of legality/. Thus, they draw the masses gradually more decisively and broadly into the struggle whose goal is to overthrow the bourgeoisie and deprive it of land tenure.

Regardless of the kind of administration formed as a result of ADPR, the first program implemented will still be the revolutionary democratic transformations of ADPR. This program is the first step in breaking the back of the principal enemy economically, socially and politically, is the broadest framework for

establishing and preserving the revolutionary unity of the popular classes and is a quantum leap in progress towards socialism. Political revolution is a question of holding office, while social revolution-socialism is a lengthy, gradual process.

The reason why social revolution is a lengthy process is that private ownership of the means of production cannot be abolished in one thrust. The ability to do this would require raising the existing producing forces to a level to make common ownership of property possible at one thrust and this is a matter of time. The proletarian revolution will change society in a /slow/ process and private property will disappear at the rate at which development of the forces of production makes common property possible.

ADPR, under proletarian hegemony, will introduce /first and foremost/ a democratic constitution, a democratic state and, thus, /indirectly/ political sovereignty of the proletariat. It will democratize society.

Democracy, if it cannot be utilized as the means of putting into practice the measures which would bring about the gradual elimination of private property at the rate allowed by the level of development of the forces of production and which would guarantee the means to live and work, is of no use to the working class.

Of course, all of the measures in the program cannot be applied at once. However, one will always lead to the next. Having once made the initial attack on private property, the proletariat will be in a position to advance further, to gradually concentrate all capital, all production and exchange, all transportation and communications in the hands of the state. These measures will be accomplished step by step in proportion to the growth of the forces of production.

Thus the proletariat, by utilizing its political superiority, will, /by degrees/, strip the bourgeoisie of its capital, centralize all of the means of production in the hands of the state and develop the forces of production most rapidly. For this reason, these measures seem inadequate economically, but require new attacks on the old order of society as the struggle advances and are indispensable measures in revolutionizing the form of production in its entirety.

This is the logic of the ADPR program. However, if it were to impose the conditions of class warfare, the working class would be ready, too, to do otherwise, to destroy private ownership of the means of production in an instant. This would mean more hardship for the working populace, a harder fight, but the forces of production existing in Turkey are at a level to ensure passage through such narrow straits through the revolutionary dedication and decisiveness of the people. Yet the bourgeoisie would quickly disappear in this process.

## 5. Socialist Society, Socialist State

### 5.1. Socialism: Period of Conversion to Communism

Socialism is usually described as "government by the working class, collective ownership of the means of production and a planned economy."



"Socialism" is not an historically independent socioeconomic structure, a form of production. Socialism is the substage of communism.

Socialism is not a stage one goes through, completes and then passes on to the next. The transition from capitalism to communism is a continuously on-going and expanding transformation under proletarian dictatorship. /Socialism is communism containing the remnants of capitalist society/.

"To Each According to His Input"

Socialism is a step in the process towards the absence of material production, but which rests on material production. Elements such as economic incentives, economic accounting, money, credit and trade are elements of material production.

The forces of production of socialist society represent a level in which the principle "to each according to his need" cannot be applied. Since labor involves the drawing of distinctions, collective labor can be measured not by the duration of labor expended directly, but by /the average expenditure of labor needed collectively/.

For this reason, the /law of value/ applies in socialist society. The mark of socialism is "to each according to his input." This input may be measured only by the law of value, otherwise there is no difference in the value of goods in socialism.

The existence of material relationships exemplifies the existence of an ever-present tendency within the system towards re-establishment of colonial relationships. This tendency, at the same time, affects the development of the class stratifications still lingering. On the other hand, material relationships in socialism have a special status based on collective ownership, functioning within the planned economy and devoid of spontaneity.

The law of value will disappear under communism when collective labor is measured by the /duration of labor expended directly/. At that time, production will become a product of labor which is produced only for collective consumption and will cease to be property to be bought and sold.

Classes, Class Struggle under Socialism

The /division of labor/ which manifests itself in urban-rural conflicts and conflicts between mental and manual labor, persists in the period of socialism and the classes and strata experience regional and ethnic distinctions based on this.

The classes under socialism are different classes /because/ they have differences as to their positions vis-a-vis the means of production, their roles in the collective organization of labor and their forms of income distribution.

Socialism is a period in which classes exist and, therefore, the class struggle /goes on/. However, this is a unique struggle of classes whose identities change in the process of progress towards communism.

The period of socialism contains the potential for turning back to capitalism, considering it appropriate and marching on communism, depending on the international and intranational balances of power and the /class policy pursued/ in this unique class struggle. The first stage of communism is not a spontaneous development switching from socialism to communism, but depends directly on the political line pursued and the development of /active/ mass democracy.

Socialism has created the objective basis for the ability to resolve interclass conflicts based on different interests in a way that will speed development. However, it is necessary that these conflicts be seen in time and resolved under the /right policy/.

Class differences disappear under communism only through enormous development of the forces of production.

#### Socialism Holds Remnant of State Capitalist Society

The state is the remnant of capitalism in the first stage of communism.

Communism in its first stage has not achieved perfect economic maturity and is not totally free of the habits and residues of capitalism. Communism, therefore, retains in the first stage the "narrow framework of the bourgeois law."

The concept of "rights" (the notion that people have rights as to what they do, what they strive for and what they get) remains current under socialism because economic development is inadequate. Each has the /right/ to take only to the extent that he gives to society. /Rights are dependent upon contribution/. Overcoming this restriction depends on raising labor productivity. Rights and the law dictate the relationship of the worker under socialism to the means of production and the results of labor.

The law as regards the distribution of property envisages the existence of the /state/ as indispensable. The law is nothing without an apparatus to /enforce/ the rules of law.

The remnants of capitalist society in the first stage of communism are evident also in the distinctions between mental and manual labor which the state represents. Intellectuals, political cadres and administrators do not go so far as communism. The economic-political formation to which this sector's relations with the working class give rise is not of the type "to be lifted" by decision.

State possession of the means of production also is indicative of the simultaneous existence of elements of capitalism and communism in socialism. State ownership, the indicator of the state of proletarian dictatorship, is the form of possession which ensures the most consistent and rapid development and the most rapid transformation to communism. However, it is not communism, but an element of /capitalism/. The form which "ownership" takes under communism (a concept which will be meaningless at that stage) is not state ownership, but joint ownership by the community of producers, all individuals engaged in productive labor.

State ownership under proletarian dictatorship ceases to be capitalist only because and to the extent that it serves all the people. Dismantling in its /entirety/ the capitalist character of state ownership will be complete only with the disappearance of the division of labor, that is, when all people are engaged in productive labor, upon the transition to communism and the disappearance of the state. At that time, there will be no "ownership" in this sense.

#### Socialist State Is Proletarian Dictatorship

Proletarian dictatorship is not a question of government imposed by a particular method of seizing power, but is a reality deriving from being the state.

The role of the state as enforcer depends on the existence of classes, not the existence of the capitalist class. Socialism is proletarian dictatorship.

That relationships between individuals assume the status of materialistic relationships by means of the social division of labor and that these require regulation and enforcement are situations which will disappear only when individuals regain sovereignty over the materialistic forces and relationships and /allow the division of labor to disappear/.

As long as the social division of labor and classes persist, as long as work fails to achieve the ideal status as a means of pleasure, there will be a need for the state (the role of enforcer). The law, labor laws, courts, labor discipline, etc. are all indicators of this imperative. To say "to each according to his input" is to say compulsory work, /labor based on force/. Persistence of the concept of rights is indicative of this force.

To deal with the state only in terms of pressure against the enemy classes is intrinsically right in the final solution. The state is an abstraction of society, of all the individuals of the society. It represents constraints on the individuals of the class which rules it also.

/Proletarian dictatorship covers the period of time from the establishment by the working class of its own state to the accession of communism/. It undergoes internal changes during this time, and /its function/ changes in conjunction with the development of class warfare at home and abroad. These changes are the process of the state withering away. This process will progress to new stages /with the collapse of imperialism on a world scale/.

/World proletarian dictatorship/ is the instance of the irreversible sovereignty of socialism, when it supercedes imperialism in all areas. It is for exactly this reason that the state cannot disappear in any nation prior to achieving this stage.

The withering away of the state, as well as the disappearance of the classes, will take place on the foundation of the worldwide development of the forces of production. Communism can come about, therefore, only on a world scale.

/Communism cannot occur in a single country/.

## 5.2. Socialist Democracy

### Best State Under Proletarian Dictatorship Is Active Mass Democracy

Because the same state can be organized in many different ways substantively, the relationship between socialism and democracy which creates no problem in theory does create various problems in practice.

Proletarian dictatorship substantively represents the interests of the majority. Democracy, too, is the rule of the majority. The gap between substance and form may gradually widen depending on the current climate, errors in the party line and so forth. For a gap between substance and form in the practice of democracy to reach that point means state disregard for the proletarian initiative. It means that government continues to be a specialty field and is conducted in a way in which proletarian influence is inadequate. When the majority does not actively take part in the affairs of state, the state filters upward out of the hands of the majority, and this is bureaucratic deformation.

Democracy under socialism, government of the majority, will be attained primarily by dismantling the bourgeois state, which keeps the working person out of government by various ruses and is the vehicle for his oppression, and replacing it with the proletarian state. Establishing a state of the majority is in itself the world's most democratic achievement.

It does not end with this, however. Because the goal is self-government by the majority, not government by a group on behalf of the majority (bureaucracy), warfare is to be launched against state bureaucracy. Measures are to be taken not just to destroy the old, but to prevent the new from turning against the people.

In addition, /all/ democratic rights and freedoms, which are the gains of the history of mankind, will be guaranteed the working people in a measure which no bourgeois state could supply. Thus democracy, which is government of the majority, bears within it the seeds of opportunity for /minority views to become majority views/.

Democracy cannot be understood simply as casting votes. /Democracy is a continuous process of forming opinion and making decisions/. Because this is true, it /demands the opportunity for extensive debate/ in all areas, at all levels. A democracy which has not created the climate of debate, does not have forums where different views are presented and has not institutionalized open debate is at best democracy by acquiescence. Yet socialism requires active mass democracy.

A logically consistent democracy (government of the majority) requires proletarian dictatorship, the power of the oppressed majority. By the same token, proletarian dictatorship, which is the state of the oppressed majority, requires democracy, which is to say government of the majority. For this reason, the most suitable form of government under proletarian dictatorship is /active mass democracy/.

## Democracy Under Socialism Prerequisite for Advancing to Communism

a) Socialism is a class society in which class conflicts occur. Democracy, however, allows the class struggle to be organized more freely, more openly and more broadly. The special interests of the various classes and strata which exist under socialism can be procured only through socialist democracy.

The interests of the classes and strata in socialist society, exactly as under capitalism, appear in their most concentrated form in the political arena. The socialist state is forced to take into political consideration the special interests of the various classes and strata existing in society. This is by way only of centralization and the ability to consolidate successfully the /mass initiative/ at every level (organizational, regional or social).

b) State ownership of property under socialism /represents/ ownership by all the people, not itself. For this reason, the distinction between the workforce and the means of production cannot disappear in the full sense. The worker allows the state the ownership of the means of production for use on his own behalf.

Under socialism, the organization and administration of society and production are still a specialized field. The producing-governing distinction persists, though steadily declining.

The question of class sovereignty over the state is different from the question of running the state. This is an important contradiction of the stage of revolutionary transformation to communism. The working class is the dominant class, but it is not ready to run the state. It must accept a sector (the bureaucracy) which is necessary to perform this task on its behalf. The answer to the question of how well it can oversee the bureaucracy will determine how far it will progress towards communism. How well it can oversee the bureaucracy is the same thing as how extensively democracy is practiced and how deeply working class-state integration has taken root.

To the extent that the state, in essence superimposed on the society, becomes bureaucratized and alienated from the working class, the integration of the workforce and the means of production /becomes merely cosmetic/.

c) This integration has an objective foundation under socialism. When the means of production come into the possession of the proletarian dictatorship, the opportunity to close the gap between the masses and the state has occurred for the first time in history. Development in labor, economic development and political development have then been attached directly to one another. Further, the political problem of the withering away of the state and the economic problem of the elimination of the division of labor have been attached to each other. Therefore, the economy and the state both look to active participation of the people in order to progress.

The gradual expansion of democracy in the full sense, expansion of the people's practice of democracy, during the first stage of communism is /essential/ for society to be able to progress from this stage to the ultimate stage of communism, the classless and stateless society.



### 5.3. Founding of Socialism, Socialist Democracy in Turkey

In a socialist Turkey, as elsewhere, the universal characteristics of socialism would coexist with the /temporary/ characteristics rooted in our society's own development.

Socialism is founded on the base developed by capitalism and is an advanced stage of it. Turkey has more than the required minimum base for establishing socialism. However, to establish true socialism based on developed, widespread forces of production would be a long process in terms of time. It would require an extremely rapid covering of the area prepared so inadequately by capitalism beforehand. Establishing socialism in Turkey would be harder than conducting revolution.

The elimination of private property and establishment of collective property in Turkey would bring the production relationships into harmony with only a /portion/ of the forces of production existing in society. That portion is the area in which capitalist mechanized production exists. For this reason and especially in order to allow time for the development of the forces of production in the most rapid way possible, various forms of capitalist property ownership would be put to use temporarily. In conjunction with this, a monopoly private businesses would be nationalized gradually over a long period of time and the collectivization movement in particular would be slow and voluntary. Credit from capitalist nations which did not interfere with our sovereignty rights would be used.

Turkish society cannot be closed in upon itself in any way, but our people would be encouraged in every way possible to become directly acquainted with the entire world.

Socialism in Turkey would grow stronger every day through the conscious, active effort of the party in parallel with development over time of the forces of production, the maturing of the form of production and the rising cultural level.

History has shown that socialism based on the energy of the masses helps a nation develop much faster than capitalism. The best example of this is the experiment of the Soviet Union. The forces of production under proletarian dictatorship have advanced at extraordinary speed despite civil war, occupation and the destructive impact of World War II. Socialism has passed the practical test of time, proving that it is a system which brings humanity true freedom and liberation.

Proletarian dictatorship, because it both represents the interests of the majority and wholly /presupposes/ democracy, is infinitely more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois state.

Owing to the lack of development and petit bourgeois character of the country, certain characteristics of proletarian dictatorship in Turkey would inevitably be different from what they would be in developed nations.

/Long-term differences/ as well as the short- and medium-term differences must be taken into account from the standpoint of socialist democracy in Turkey. Long-term differences are differences which can be made up only through generations of effort. They are the difference between less development and development.

The democratic aspects of Turkish society have remained backward for various historical, cultural, economic, social and international reasons. The extreme infancy of /civic society/ is an important indicator of this backwardness. It is necessary that civic organizations gradually occupy a larger place in state government and in every area of social life. Socialist democracy can be attained and developed only in this way, and rights can thrive only through the active participation and oversight of the masses.

/Civic society, economic development and cultural development/, the three together will bring proletarian democracy to a level approaching socialism in Turkey.

It is necessary that the party consciously take the lead in the democratic development of Turkish society, because democracy, the expansion of the democracy of socialism to the point of self-abnegation, is the essential condition for transition to communism.

Communism requires and presupposes the /highest centralism possible/ of large-scale production nationwide. However, the greater the impact of the central authority -- centralization -- parallel to development of the socialist economy, the greater the impact of the foundation on which it sits -- democracy. /Creative activity at the base is the fundamental element of the new public life. Vigorous, creative socialism will be the Turkish people's own product/.

Active mass democracy, the best form of government under proletarian dictatorship, depends on the extent to which our program can be put into practice initially in Turkey and the conditions during and after the revolution. This is all we wish to achieve. This is what we will overcome all obstacles to establish.

## 6. Communist Party

### TCP Is Internationalist

The TCP adheres closely to internationalism, which means /ideological and political/ unity in the struggle to wipe out exploitation of the workers of all peoples and create a classless society.

Proletarian internationalism holds that the interests of the proletarian struggle in one nation must be bound to the interests of the same struggle on a world scale.

The concept of international unity of working class interests and goals does not spring forth automatically from movements within national boundaries. For this reason, the TCP will stubbornly pursue its task to convey the ideas of proletarian internationalism to the working class, to fight nationalism uncompromisingly. It recognizes its duty to fight the trends which damage the unity on the Marxist-Leninist foundation of the world worker and communist movement. It is aware of the tight bond between nationalism and opportunism and revisionism.

The TCP believes in the need for the world proletariat to have a global strategy and organization worldwide. Today, a central international organization has become more important -- the problem of reconciling the independence of communist parties, since there is no world party, and of the unity of the communist movement on the foundation of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

There are no irreconcilable conflicts within the working class, but there are different approaches. If so, then there is bound to be debate in a spirit of brotherhood also. The TCP, as a part of the world communist movement, sets forth its views in this spirit.

The attitude towards world revolution and, therefore, towards the Soviet Union and other socialist nations is the main criterion of proletarian nationalism. The TCP always puts the interests of world revolution above all else.

Proletarian internationalism places before every communist party the priority task of revolution in its own country. It is by way of this in essence that existing socialism and the world communist movement are defended and world peace preserved.

#### TCP Is Party of All Workers

Communists have always favored the organization of the proletariat in the largest, strongest, most centralized units possible. If there are no objective conditions making separate organization necessary, the proletariat organizes in a single party. This is the requirement of proletarian internationalism.

If a movement does not defend the organizational unity of the workers within the same state boundaries, it means it has not broken off from bourgeois nationalism.

The objective conditions in Turkey make necessary the organization of the Kurdish and Turkish proletariat in a single party nationwide. Doubtless, from an ethnic standpoint, Turkish Kurdistan is a part of Kurdistan. However, the organizing framework of the proletariat is defined not by this, but by the fact that the conditions for struggle are general.

#### TCP Is Leader of Turkish Working Class

The Turkish Communist Party, the voluntary union of communists adhering to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, is the ideological-political vanguard of the working class. Its purpose is to establish proletarian dictatorship and attain communism through revolution.

The communist party has no interest other than the interests of the proletariat as a whole. In the various stages of development of the working class struggle against the bourgeoisie, it represents the interests of the movement as a whole at all times and in all places.

Communists, therefore, join together in the TCP as the most advanced, most class-conscious elements of the working class.

The essence of the communists' work and their purpose in designating the proletariat as an independent party separate from other working class parties is to raise the consciousness of the working class to communist consciousness at every opportunity and in all situations.

The TCP, which is at the same time the true representative of the interests of all who work, conducts its efforts among all sectors of the people.

#### TCP Adheres to Leninist Principles of Organization

##### Propaganda and agitation:

The first, invariable duty of communists is to conduct systematic, multidimensional, orthodox propaganda and agitation. The need to inculcate the masses with the view of revolution by violence lies at the root of Marxist theory. Constant and consistent warfare against bourgeois ideology is the precondition for revolution.

##### Central Organ:

The central organ basically conducts the party propaganda and agitation effort. The central publication "is not only a collective propagandist and collective agitator, but at the same time a collective organizer."

Organization encompassing the distribution network of the central organ and education at the central organ base constitute the basis of our party's /constant and common action/.

##### Membership:

The party member is anyone who adopts the party program and joins the party, works in one of the party organizations in the manner envisaged in the bylaws and regularly pays membership dues.

##### Cell Principle:

The basic organizational unit of the communist party is the cell. The cell is the individual unit to which all party members must belong. The basic organization formed according to place of work and residence constitutes the party's closest and most extensive relationship with the working masses.

##### Organization of Professional Revolutionaries:

At the same time, it strives for a membership accomplished as professional revolutionaries, self-taught, skilled in the special arts of revolutionary warfare and wholly devoted to the party.

##### Industrial Concentration:

Our party stresses the training of /worker revolutionaries/ in particular. This brings organizing and leadership in the factories into the working class. The party does this according to the principle of /industrial concentration/. It concentrates organization in key factories and strategic branches of labor.

### Criticism-Self Criticism:

Criticism-self criticism at the individual and collective level is the primary condition for the unity, development and growth of the communist party. Its purpose is the continuous strengthening of the party's ability to serve the working class and humanity.

The purpose of criticism is to improve the party's contribution to the common goal, not to tear down the individual or collective criticized. It demonstrates why the attitude criticized does not serve the interests of the class and the party.

Bourgeois and petit bourgeois ideologies continuously impact upon the party and infiltrate the party. If the incidental errors of individuals or collectives are not rectified, the trend may become a deviation. Criticism-self criticism is one of the most effective weapons against this threat.

### No Sex Discrimination in Party:

There is no sex discrimination in the party. Men must practice equality and women must insist upon it. In this way, they extend the limits of the party's fighting force.

### Legality-Illegality:

The TCP cannot confuse overtness and covertness, legality and illegality. The work of the legal party as well as the illegal party consists in varying degrees of covert and overt endeavors. Our party, working under severe conditions of illegality, expresses in the clearest way possible its unabridged ideology and political stance which is always most illegal in bourgeois society.

### Freedom:

It is impossible for the bourgeoisie to allow the communist party the freedom to conduct its revolution. The communist party which has not conducted its revolution is /as free as/ the struggle for revolutionary purposes, independently of the limits of bourgeois legality. A communist party which has conducted its revolution is /as free as/ the struggle to realize socialism, followed by the founding of communism.

### Administrative Organization:

The communist party leadership is the ideological, political and organizational vanguard of the party.

No decisive class struggle can be conducted in modern society without reliable, capable leaders, trained as professionals, seasoned by years in the school of experience and able to work in harmony.

No movement can survive without the organization of a permanent leadership to ensure its continuity. For this reason, our party places special importance on protecting the leadership cadres.



Our party places great stress on modernizing management and performance at all levels of the leadership cadres. This is necessary in order to be an organization of professional revolutionaries. The party leadership takes a continuous and influential role in the advancement of science in the TCP.

#### Cadre Concept:

Cadres cannot be evaluated at the level of the shortcomings and errors of the individuals making up those cadres. The place to look in cadre evaluation is at whether that cadre sets itself the tasks imposed by social development and strives to carry them out. This is the sign of the progress or regression of a cadre.

#### No Organization Chart:

The TCP practices the Leninist principles of organization. Starting out from the fact that, as regards concrete forms of organization, it has no rigid organization chart, it continuously adapts its structure to new circumstances.

#### TCP Is Democratic, Centralist, Disciplined

The TCP adheres to the communist party principle of organization from top to bottom under the conditions of capitalism. Anyone who believes in the party and will work within this concept is welcome to join the party ranks.

The TCP endorses the principle of democratic centralization. For those who wish to fight, a /centralist, iron-disciplined organization which adapts its democraticness to the time, place and job to be done/ is necessary.

Separation of functions and mutual oversight within the party, autonomy of local organizations in their own areas, election of party officers, and debate, party congresses and rallies open to the masses /are principles on which democraticness is based/.

Centralization refers to centrality in the implementation of decisions and in actions. Subordination of the parts to the whole, of lower organizations to superior organizations and of the minority to the majority, and the direction of the party by a central authority /are the principles on which centralism is based/.

Communist discipline develops on the foundation of ideological unity, correct policy and commitment to the masses.

A discipline confident of the organizing force of the workers and semiproletarians and based on mutual respect enlarges the circle of authority and responsibility and raises initiative in the struggle.

Communist party discipline is evident in (1) unfailing performance of tasks assigned by the party, (2) criticism-self criticism, (3) debate, (4) iron-clad unity in action and (5) financial generosity to the party. The discipline denoted by these five points is the substance of democratic-centralism.

The bylaws are the document of organizational unity and operation. They are the party's constitution.

#### TCP and Religion

Religion is not a personal question from the point of view of the communist party. The communist party is not indifferent to the scientific impoverishment and ignorance perpetrated in the form of religious belief. Our party conducts atheist propaganda.

Our party believes that, until the working class becomes enlightened through its own struggle against the forces of capitalism, atheistic propaganda cannot sufficiently enlighten the working class in this direction. It provides leadership in the struggle against any form of capital domination of the masses. It attaches atheistic propaganda to its fundamental duty, the duty of developing the class struggle against the oppressors.

8349

CSO: 3554/85

## SHORTENED WORK WEEK CLAIMED TO ENHANCE EMPLOYMENT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 21 Dec 83 p 1

[Article by correspondent Rolf-Dietrich Schwartz: "Shortened Work Week Increases Employment. Unexpected Results From Research Institutes."]

[Text] By shortening individual working time for working people in the form of part-time work, eliminating overtime, short-time work and wage agreement regulations, approximately 2.9 million people more were employed between 1970 and 1981 than with constant working time.

This surprisingly great effect of reductions in working time on employment is one of the numerous results which in its expert opinion the Rhine-Westfalian Institute for Economic Research (RWI) contributed to the structural report of the five leading German research institutes.

The structural reports, which were put together again for the first time in 3 years by DIW [German Institute for Economic Research]-Berlin, HWWA [Hamburg International Economic Archive], Machine Tool Institute-Kiel, Ifo [Institute for Economic Research]-Munich and RWI-Essen and which deal with the causes and rate of economic structural change in the FRG lead in part--when measured against prevailing opinions--to surprising results. Thus, a majority of the institutes (DIW, Ifo, RWI), according to the expert opinions which were put together in competition with one another and which were available to FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, warns of the mistaken belief of being able to slow the trend toward rationalization investments, which through lower wage increases or cautious wage policy eliminate jobs, or of being able to improve the international competitiveness of the German economy in the existing system of flexible exchange rates.

12124

CSO: 3620/131

## EARLY RETIREMENT BILL SEEN AS ALTERNATIVE TO 35-HOUR WEEK

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 21 Dec 83 p 1

[Article: "Bluem: Offer to State, Workers and Employers"]

[Text] Minister for Labor Bluem has characterized the bill which has now been passed by the Cabinet concerning the introduction of an early retirement regulation for older workers as the Federal government's offer for an "employment pact" between the state, employers and workers. On Tuesday the minister for labor advocated the view that the bill might contribute to moderating positions in the upcoming wage talks; moreover, he said it is an offer to the bargaining parties, which should be taken seriously, to reduce unemployment markedly. Moreover, so far the bill concerning regulation of early retirement is the only well-known form of reducing working time with a "mechanism for reemployment" of the unemployed. Bluem characterized the law as urgent; if the schedule for discussion in parliament is observed it could be passed in April.

Specifically, the Cabinet agreed on the following regulation for early retirement: limited to 5 years, workers can retire early at age 59 and make their job available for younger unemployed workers. A prerequisite for this is either a company agreement between the employer and the workers or a wage agreement. The worker receives "early retirement pay" amounting to 65 percent of his previous gross wage; after deductions for social security and the wage tax his net amounts to about 70 percent of his previous net wage. Early retirement pay is thus higher than unemployment pay and the old-age pension from the statutory social security pension fund which a worker with average earnings can expect after 40 years of being insured.

For this "early retirement pay" the employer receives a subsidy of 40 percent from the Federal Labor Office if he hires an unemployed person or an additional apprentice to replace the retiring worker. The early retirement pay must amount contractually by the bargaining parties; they can be subsidized up to a maximum of 65 percent. In general, public service is certainly not excluded from this regulation, but the Federal government, of course, does not want to offer its collective bargaining partners early retirement following Bluem's model. In this connection the minister for labor referred to the fact that in public service the government is following a

different labor market policy: it will push more for the creation of part-time jobs and other forms of making working life flexible.

Bleum referred expressly to the fact that the regulation is voluntary for both workers and employers. If both sides did not take up the government's offer, then nothing could come of the "employment pact." For small companies with fewer than 20 employees Bluem provided for a "middle level clause": it is to guarantee that the voluntary involvement of employers is likewise not restricted by a collective bargaining agreement.

12124

CS0: 3620/131



## DGB THREATENED WITH SPLIT OVER 35-HOUR WORK WEEK

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 2 Jan 84 p 8

[Article by Hugo Mueller-Vogg: "The Gap Widens. DGB Trade Unions Are Split Not Only Over the 35-Hour Work Week"]

[Text] The DGB's leaders pass up no opportunity to play down differences of opinion between the individual trade unions in respect to the "best" form of shortening the work week. In his many statements at the turn of the year, DGB chairman Breit speaks emphatically of "many routes which lead to a reduction in working time." Muhr, his deputy, made the statement that the issue was shortening "working time and working life" and that supporters of the 35-hour work week and the "negotiated pension" can select from that whatever they want.

Regardless of all compromises, important DGB trade unions are divided into two camps. With the protection of the powerful Metalworkers Union the trade unions for Commerce, Banks and Insurance, Printing and Paper, Timber and Plastics, Education and Science and even the German Postal Employees Union also give priority to the 35-hour work week. On the other hand, the group of advocates of the negotiated pension, which inside the trade unions is known as the "Gang of Five," consists of the trade unions for Construction, Mining and Energy, Chemicals, Paper and Ceramics, Textiles, Clothing and Food Production and Catering. The five represent only one-fourth the DGB members, the other six more than half.

Chairman Volkmar of the Commerce, Banks and Insurance Union is undoubtedly right when he points to the fact that in spite of the differing attitudes toward the kind of reduction in working time which is to be accomplished, there is significant agreement between the 17 DGB organizations in the economic policy sector. Nonetheless, there is more that separates the six trade unions on the one side of the working-time "front" and the five on the other side. There is also a gap between the two camps in the political-ideological sector. The advocates of a shorter work week are not least concerned with the issue of confrontation with the employers, with the "question of power" in this society which has been played up by second chairman Steinkuehler of the Metalworkers Union. On the other hand, the Gang of Five is making demands which might clearly be the subject of negotiations and compromises.

The basic differences between the two working-time groups emerged clearly 3 years ago when the DGB basic program was passed and they can be quite clearly understood from the attitude toward the instrument of the political strike. Thus, the Metalworkers Union, the Commerce, Banks and Insurance Union, the Printing Union, the Timber and Plastics Union and the Education and Science Union had always been cooperative at the extraordinary DGB congress in 1981 whenever it was a question of giving the basic program the appearance of a "class struggle." This coalition not least saw to it that the program continued to cling to the likewise outdated and false assertion that development in the FRG had resulted in a "reestablishment of old conditions of ownership and power." At that time the same trade unions also forced acceptance of the arrogant statement that the trade unions serve the "demands of the general welfare" by their activities alone.

While the pragmatic "rightist" trade unions had more or less passively endured the debate on the program, they do not shy away from the conflict within the trade unions if it is a question of a too close association with the "Peace Movement," if individual "progressive" trade unionists very openly make common cause with the German communists or if certain functionaries repeatedly try to form something on the order of a new extra-parliamentary opposition from among the trade unions, the Greens, the Peace Movement and other "initiatives." And while, for example, trade union chairmen Schmidt (Mining), Rappe (Chemicals), Doeding (Food Production) or Keller (Textiles, Clothing) repeatedly warn the SPD of getting too far removed from "Godesberg," the Social Democrats from the ranks of the Metalworkers Union, the Banking Union or the Printing Union are constantly reproached for too little involvement in the ideas of the "new social movements."

It is no accident that the line separating supporters and opponents of a quick reduction in the work week with full wage equalization is identical to the line which separates the DGB trade unionists in their attitude toward the "political strike." It is not even an issue for the Textiles, Food, Mining, Construction and Chemicals Unions that employee organizations in a parliamentary-pluralist system do not have the right to act with the means of the strike against decisions by parliaments or governments which have legally come into being. On the other hand, at their trade union congresses fall four of the other six declared that the "political" strike against NATO counterarming is a "legitimate form of battle" (Printing Union) and emphatically expressed themselves in favor of discussion (Postal Employees and Education) about the general strike to prevent counterarming or of announcing the general strike in the event that democracy is endangered if there is counterarming (Metalworkers Union). The Timber and Plastics Union is of like mind in this question. And in the case of Commerce and Banks we must anticipate similar decisions at 1984 trade union congresses.

There is nothing new about the fact that within the DGB there are differences of opinion between individual organizations. It is likewise not surprising that individual trade unions are committing themselves prior to wage talks to different goals, finally, prospects of success and the fighting capability also vary from industry to industry. An unpleasant, indeed dangerous development for the DGB leadership, however, is the fact that the vehicle

of the working time question will be used to decide what ideological direction in the future will have greater influence within the German trade union movement: "counterpower" theoreticians for whom the struggle for the 35-hour week is not least a question of the struggle per se--or the pragmaticians who sense a co-responsibility for this state and reject confrontation for the sake of confrontation.

12124

CSO: 3620/131

## INDUSTRY CONFEDERATION WORRIED ABOUT DROP IN FACTORY OUTPUT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Dec 83 p 10

[Article by Truls Martinsen: "Production Down in Economic Upswing: Norwegian Industry to Have Zero Growth Next Year"]

[Text] Norwegian industrial production is declining, even during an economic upswing, and this is worrying the Norwegian Industry Confederation. Industrial production in Norway will decline by at least 1.5 percent this year. A half year ago the confederation thought that the decline could be limited to one half of a percent. Although the upswing in parts of the export industry, primarily aluminum and ferroalloys, has been considerable, it has not been strong enough to balance the decline in the large part of our industry which must compete here at home. The industry confederation expects zero growth in industrial production next year.

The industry confederation on Thursday presented its semiannual economic report and Administrative Director Knut Lofstad made no secret of the fact that he generally has a dimmer view of the prospects for Norwegian industry today than he did a half year ago, in spite of certain bright spots. The bright spots are primarily in the raw materials industry--the production of metals, which will have increased production next year, too. But our finished goods industry will continue to have to work hard, he believed.

## Poor Desire to Invest

The industry confederation expects that the upswing in the USA will continue next year, too, but according to industry confederation Division Director Tor Steig this will not be strong enough to involve Western Europe in an upswing which can reduce unemployment.

According to the industry confederation's estimates, investment in industry will decline next year, with an estimate of by 5 percent, both because of industry's poor capacity for self-financing and because of the level of costs here at home.

Exports of traditional goods and oil increased relatively strongly this year. The confederation is counting on total growth in exports of 5 percent this

year, but expects no increase in export sums next year. The majority of the increase in these sums will be due to price increases.

The industry confederation also does not expect any growth in the gross national product next year.

Division Director Steig reported that concerns in Norway sensitive to economic conditions, metal exporters who benefited from the economic upswing and the increase in the rate of exchange for the dollar, will have a mild increase in profits this year. But for Norwegian industry as a whole operating results will be about the same this year as last year, he believed.

Both the industry confederation's own estimates and public estimates show that it is industry which must be in charge of growth in production and the creation of assets which must take place if we in the years to come up to the turn of the century are to be able to maintain employment and the standard of living. Director Knut Lofstad in this connection asked for broad understanding of industry's situation and for measures which can lower costs. Industry does not need subsidies but relief in, among other things, taxes, energy prices and wage costs, if it is to cope with its task, he believed.

As far as wages are concerned, the industry confederation believes, as does the government, that the growth in wages from this year to next year must not exceed 4.5 percent if competitiveness is not to worsen. This means that there is room for just 2 to 2.5 percent of an increase in wages next year, since 2 percent has already gone for wage increases this year.

If the need for industrial growth is taken seriously, there is no room for wage increases on the whole, said Steig. Against the background of industry's situation, he found the development risky, that wage negotiations are "indexed," i.e., that purchasing power is discussed more than possibilities for wage increases.

The industry confederation regards it as unrealistic today to advocate a new devaluation of the Norwegian krone. Experience has demonstrated that it is not possible to devalue without being faced with demands for compensation for increased prices from wage earners. But Lofstad made no secret of the fact that it would be an advantage if the Norwegian krone soon found a lower rate of exchange on the exchange curve than today and called attention to the fact that this is a situation which is regulated by the Bank of Norway. Nevertheless, his main point is that now we have to do some belt tightening here at home, even if not dramatically. Consumption is too high, Lofstad said.

It was demonstrated in the semiannual report that political measures which resulted in strong growth in public and private consumption and in transferring to businesses and private individuals were made at a time when the economic prospects for growth of the economy seemed far more favorable than today.

"We cannot get around making a reassessment of the measures of the 1970's regarding disposal of income," it reads in the report. But the confederation realizes that it will be no easy process, for the measures have created expectations among many groups.



## STATOIL PRESENTS PLANS FOR DEVELOPING GULLFAKS FIELD

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Dec 83 p 10

[Article by Bjørn H. Tretvoll: "Development Plans Ready: Production at Gullfaks in 1990"]

[Text] Stavanger, 20 December. Statoil now has the plans ready for the second phase of development at Gullfaks. The total cost of this development is estimated at 20 billion kroner. Production from this section of Gullfaks can begin at the earliest around 1990-1991, Statoil Information Chief Willy H. Olsen reports to AFTENPOSTEN.

A dry test well which was recently completed has resulted in a downward adjustment of reserves in this part of the Gullfaks field from about 100 million tons to about 90 million tons. This downward adjustment has resulted in the fact that Statoil is now planning on using only one platform in phase two of Gullfaks development. In addition, the company will use up to 11 underwater wells. This change in plans is of no special significance for the project's total finances, Olsen reports.

The development plans will be ready for discussion by the company's management right after the turn of the year. They will be able to be sent to the authorities at the end of January if this should be desirable, a thing which will depend on the outcome of the talks regarding the sale of gas from the Sleipner field.

"We now believe we have documented the fact that Gullfaks Phase Two can be carried out and produce a goodly yield, evaluated as an independent development project," Olsen says. When the Storting discussed the development plans for the Gullfaks field it was resolved that the project would be carried out in two phases. The first phase, which covers the western part of the field, is being carried out with two platforms. The original plans were to the effect that phase two would be carried out so that it would be possible to utilize the processing capacity which was gradually freed at the first Gullfaks platform. Statoil is now counting on carrying out phase two with a concrete platform of the same type as Gullfaks A with its own processing capacity.

Statoil chose to speed up planning work on Gullfaks Phase Two in order to have an alternative development project ready if a reasonable price is not reached for Sleipner gas. If an acceptable price is not gotten it is obvious that Statoil will advocate speeding up Gullfaks Phase Two.

But the company has still not taken a position on whether speeded-up development of Gullfaks will be advocated if there is also development of Sleipner soon.

8985

CSO: 3639/50

## DIRECTOR OF STATOIL URGES RETAINING FIRM'S ROLE, STRUCTURE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Dec 83 p 9

[Article by Bjørn H. Tretvoll: "Statoil's 'Foundation Wall' Is Solid--Should Not Be Changed"]

[Text] The management and business "foundation wall" which Statoil right from the beginning has based its operation on is solid and has made it possible to achieve good results. The company's development has not in any area been such that it would provide reasons for changes in this "foundation wall." It is the State Oil Company's Administrative Director Arve Johnsen who in this manner sums up to AFTENPOSTEN his views in the discussion regarding Statoil's future position.

At the end of a year with extensive political debate regarding the company's role in Norwegian oil operations, Johnsen expressed a strong hope that 1984 will bring clarification in this question. He makes no secret of the fact that he thinks the best thing will be for the company to continue its operations under the same terms as hitherto. If no clarification is received next year, Statoil will continue as now, he believes.

"I have yet to meet anyone who can say how we have failed or who can point to decisions which provide a basis for demanding changes. We ought to be evaluated according to our results, and they indicate that Statoil has functioned according to its intention," Johnsen emphasizes.

He thinks that the broad national agreement regarding the main features of Norwegian oil policy has been a strength. "I think there are good possibilities that this agreement will be extended into the 1980's and 1990's, and I am certain that the basic question regarding Statoil's future will be decided on the basis of what serves national interests the best," Johnsen says, who believes that he notices a dawning realization that work on the tasks Statoil was assigned to carry out can be controlled best via the existing arrangements.

The so-called Mellbye Committee has, for one thing, proposed that Statoil's shares in various blocks be reduced and that the State itself hold considerable shares in new blocks. The government has announced a Storting report on Statoil's role in the spring of 1984.

## Big Shares

[Question] Cannot Statoil via its duties as operator attend to the State's interests although smaller shares are gotten in each block?

[Answer] "No, it is of completely central importance that Statoil retain its large shares. This is the very main nerve of the company's operation. Shares which ensure a majority in the individual concession group make it possible to get resolutions through and constitute an important part of Statoil's strength versus other companies." The Statoil chief's answer to this point is especially clear and forthright--and on an obvious collision course with the Mellbye Committee's proposals.

Johnsen admits that the longlasting debate regarding Statoil's role has created certain problems for the company. "We have learned to live with this, although in some areas we have had to heave to a little. But the rest of the oil sector has certainly been pleased about this long discussion regarding a splintering up of Statoil. While we have been shot at, all the others have gotten off scot-free," Johnsen says.

He finds it "somewhat disappointing" that the government did not take a position on important matters in connection with the year's discussion of the company's plans. "The administrative tool which exists is not being used to its fullest," Johnsen says. He characterizes Storting Representative Reidar Due's recent statement to the effect that we are in an "oil policy vacuum" as "an observation which certainly has something to it."

On the other hand, Johnsen perceives the Storting's discussion of Statoil's so-called Paragraph 10 Plan as a positive debate. "There is great understanding of the effort we are making with the tasks assigned to us, a thing which we in the company appreciate," he says.

## Who is Controlling Whom?

[Question] Some claim that it is Statoil which is controlling the Storting, and not vice-versa.

[Answer] "We are a little tired of such claims, for we know that this is not true. Statoil is trying hard to have proper relations with the authorities. We are given our scope and within this we stand up for receiving maximum disbursement in behalf of the State. Some perhaps believe that we are too active as far as arguing in behalf of our views is concerned, but this is what produces results," Johnsen says, who admits that at periods an important part of his work day can be spent on contact with decision makers.

[Question] Does it create frustration when the authorities oppose the company's proposals?

[Answer] "There is too much of a push-on mood at Statoil for us to let ourselves be frustrated. We count on turning around into something positive any defeats we might have. We cannot let such things get to us. In that

case we would not be able to develop a team which still scrambles for some places up in the oil business's first division," Johnsen emphasizes.

He will not agree to claims that politicians have too poor knowledge of the oil business. "The Storting's Energy and Industry Committee has demonstrated an imposing ability to make decisions in important matters which in times to come will be judged as very foresighted," the Statoil director believes.

#### A Dwarf Among Giants

"We work every day in an environment which can be quite militant. In comparison with the international oil companies, Statoil is like a dwarf among giants and it is not always that we have merging interests. We constantly have to insist in ups and downs in order to advance our views." It is Statoil Administrative Director Arve Johnsen who gives this characterization of the company's relations with the big multinational oil companies.

"There is no doubt that a few years ago attempts were made to fool us. The first few years Statoil was considered almost as a fly in the soup, but this situation has changed. Now we are ourselves in a position to evaluate the technological solutions these companies present," Johnsen says.

He emphasizes that Statoil in order to be an equal opponent must have expertise which covers the entire broad spectrum the oil business includes.

"With these companies it is necessary to be able to place authority behind one's words, by having an understanding of the issues in question. If one demonstrates that one has, one gets respect and is treated accordingly," Johnsen points out.

He has no special understanding of the complaints of the Norwegian tax level which several of the foreign companies have come out with. "There are no other projects in Europe where one is paid so well as the oil and gas projects in Great Britain and Norway," he believes.

One of the issues in which Statoil and one of the large international companies have conflicting interests concerns the job of operator of the Statfjord field. "We have received a signal to the effect that we will come to get this job, and we have hopes that this matter will develop in a proper manner for us. But we are understanding regarding the fact that the authorities want to use more time on the matter," Johnsen says.

#### Statfjord a Contribution

He denies that taking over Statfjord will be an extra burden for Statoil. Such an assignment will make a valuable contribution to the understanding Statoil has developed. This will give the company an enormous opportunity to acquire operating experience far more quickly than if everything must be done from the ground up, Johnsen emphasizes.



[Question] Why should Mobil, which has indeed done a good job at Statfjord, be shoved aside?

[Answer] "There is an agreement under discussion regarding this. We have the whole time made it clear what we wanted in this matter. A change should therefore not come as any surprise for the present operator," Johnsen says, who does not agree with Mobil that there will first be regular production from all Statfjord platforms in 1988. This will be achieved in good time before 1 January 1987, which has been suggested as a possible date for the change in operators.

Johnsen points out also that several of the large international oil companies are co-owners of gas companies which buy Norwegian gas.

"Although we cannot prove that a conflict of interests has occurred, we must keep our eyes and ears open in all directions when we negotiate regarding the sale of gas together with companies which also stand behind important buyers," Johnsen emphasizes.

Mobil and the Statfjord Responsibility; Storting Should Wait Until 1985

The Mobil Oil Company, which is now the operator of the Statfjord field, thinks that the Storting must wait to the fall of 1985 to take a position on which company is to take over the final operator's responsibility for the Statfjord field, STAVANGER AFTENBLAD reports. The Storting's Industry Committee has planned on the operator question's being decided during 1984.

In a letter to Oil and Energy Minister Kåre Kristiansen, Mobil writes that the Statfjord field will not be made completely ready before early in 1988. This means that any operator takeover can first take place as of the turn of the year in 1988-89, and not as of January 1987, as there is a majority for in the Industry Committee.

The date for completion cannot be viewed only on the basis of when the field has begun regular production, it reads in the letter from Mobil.

The program for utilization of the reservoir itself must also have been clarified, the equipment which is required to operate the field must be brought in, and the water injection program must also be carried out. This can first be ready at the beginning of 1988, Mobil writes.

Profit of Six Billion

Total sales of 26 billion kroner and a profit before annual adjustments of a good 6 billion kroner. These are the main figures the Statoil concern can show for 1983 after an eventful year. Administrative Director Arve Johnsen declares himself satisfied with the development in 1983 and is looking forward to the company's being assigned new tasks next year.

"The international price drop for crude oil in the first half of the year has been balanced by higher production than planned and a very high rate of

exchange for American dollars. The development of prices for crude oil is among the big suspense factors for 1984," Johnsen says.

He calls attention to work on the Statpipe pipeline and the crossing of the Norwegian Channel as the most important event for the company in 1983. But, the work on the development of Gullfaks, the confirmation of gas deposits in the eastern half of the Troll field, together with the oil find on Haltenbanken [Halten Bank] are also events which can be of great importance to the company.

From profits of 6 billion kroner Statoil will pay a good 4 billion kroner in taxes to the State, which thus can count on a return of about 750 million kroner. The annual profit after taxes and tax-determined writeoffs will be about a billion kroner. The Statoil concern's combined investments in 1983 have reached about 10.5 billion kroner.

"The discovery of the field which has been given the name Tyrihans on Halten Bank shows that we are on the right track in this area. We hope to have this work followed up via operator assignments in new blocks in the vicinity," Johnsen says.

Statoil's plans to expand the refinery at Mongstad did not get the authorities' formal approval in 1983 either. However, Johnsen hopes that this approval can be brought up for discussion next year and that Statoil will also receive permission to carry out its terminal plans.

"If we view the development in the 100- to 150-year perspective, which we can count on the Norwegian Oil Age's lasting, it is important that we now concentrate on additional refining of crude and gamble on gaining a foothold in new markets with products and crude," Johnsen emphasizes.

He still believes that it will be to Statoil's advantage if the company gets a chance to do business beyond Norway's borders. He is hoping for the go signal for operations in China in 1984. The Danish and British continental shelves can be interesting areas for Statoil, which through its operations on the Norwegian shelf is also becoming very well acquainted with conditions on these neighboring shelves.

#### Sleipner Sales

The outcome of the talks regarding the sale of gas in the Sleipner field will be of great importance for further development on the Norwegian shelf in the next few years. Johnsen calls attention to the fact that the talks are continuing with both the buyers in question, the BGC British State gas company and with the continental gas companies. He will not speculate about what the consequences will be if it is not possible to get this gas sold for a reasonable price, but it is clear that it can have consequences for the first phase of development of the Troll field if the Sleipner gas is not sold in this round.

A total of about 170 billion cubic meters of gas have been detected on the Troms Ice Floe. It is of absolute interest to work further on this with a view toward development. In the first round it is the technical solutions which must be worked out. Any statement of profitability soon for the Askeladden field is not currently in question, but it is only a question of time before there is production in this part of the Norwegian shelf, too, Johnsen believes.

"We have only to take note of the fact that the oil and energy minister requested us to support Norsk Hydro's development solution for the Oseberg field, although it was a decision which ran counter to our professional opinion. Later the company came to agreement regarding a solution for transport ashore, something which shows that it is possible to work toward common solutions," Johnsen says.

He points out that Hydro and Statoil in many ways find themselves in different situations, together with the fact that in individual matters they will be in direct competition. A disagreement on issues will therefore often be able to arise between the two companies. We have to live with this, something which is in line with the authorities' intention to have different backgrounds which can look at issues from different viewpoints, Johnsen says, who emphasizes that the companies nevertheless can have very good cooperation in other matters.

8985

CSO: 3639/50

## OIL DIRECTORATE PLANS FIRST SEISMIC TESTS AROUND JAN MAYEN

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 4 Jan 84 p 12

[Article: "Oil Study Around Jan Mayen"]

[Text] The Oil Directorate is planning on conducting the first seismic studies of the continental shelf around Jan Mayen in 1985. The studies, which according to the plan will cost 12 to 13 million kroner, will provide more information regarding the possibility of finding oil and gas in this area.

Deputy Director Egil Bergsaker of the Oil Directorate tells AFTENPOSTEN that these studies are being made as part of the agreement regarding these areas which was entered into between Norway and Iceland. Originally it was the intention to undertake these studies in 1984, but the work has now been postponed one year for budgetary reasons.

The studies as a whole will cover about 3000 kilometers with seismic lines. The work will take place both in Norwegian and Icelandic territory. The Norwegian share constitutes 32,750 square kilometers, while Iceland's share of the territory in question is 12,750 square kilometers.

"This shelf area cannot be regarded as being especially promising in the petroleum context, but possibilities of finds cannot be disregarded. There are many other areas in Norwegian waters which are more promising, but this area is the only one in the vicinity of Iceland where there are possibilities of oil and gas finds," Bergsaker says.

The most interesting part from a geological standpoint is in the Norwegian part of the territory. According to the agreement between the two countries, however, Iceland has the right to a 25-percent share of any productive finds in this part of the shelf without the country's being required to cover any of the exploration costs.

8985

CSO: 3639/50

## SOVIETS CONTINUE TO DELAY BARENTS SEA SETTLEMENT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Dec 83 p 12

[Commentary by Kjell Dragnes: "Problems With the Dangling Fish Lines"]

[Text] "There are problems with the dangling fishing lines," say the ever-optimistic fishermen who have learned to live with the moods of the fish and sea. Something along the same line, but of course in far more diplomatic terms, can be heard from the Norwegian negotiators who spent last week in Moscow.

Hope for finding a possible solution to the boundary-line question in the Barents Sea has not vanished. But the fishing lines are still hanging in the same position as before the seventh round of discussions which commenced a good week ago. Perhaps the problem has even worsened.

Now there is something nearly capricious about the Soviet negotiating line. For the new leader of the Norwegian delegation, Per Tresselt, most of what was presented must have been familiar since he has been a participant in the boundary-line discussions since 1974.

Consistency and firmness are two words which flow easily from the pen when one characterizes the Soviet position, and that has not changed in any way worth mentioning even though there was a new leader, Yuriy Rabakov, sitting on the Soviet side of the bargaining table.

When Tresselt said at the conclusion of the discussions that there was no breakthrough or opening, it means that there was no breakthrough and no opening. But in a matter as complicated as international law, and the interpretation of it, many ways can be found to reach the goal, on which both parties are agreed--an agreement on a border delineation.

In the two years since the last round of talks in Oslo, certain developments have occurred. They consist of a new international Law of the Sea Convention, the Soviets have begun test drilling in the Barents Sea, and the 62nd Parallel is no longer an unbreakable barrier for Norwegian oil companies in the north.

Round Number 7, therefore, becomes the occasion for the deepening and elaborating of viewpoints in light of these developments, which may lead to influencing the final result, whenever that may come about.



The main principles remain the same. The Soviets insist that the boundary shall be drawn along a northerly meridian--the so-called sector principle. Norway remains similarly wedded to a different principle--the mid-line. This is a line, along which, every point lies far distant from the two countries' territory.

These principles are separated literally by a sea, more particularly, 155,000 square kilometers, which is the equivalent of half of Norway. The conflict, in reality, represents more than principles. Currently, only fish rule the area, but other resources will likely be found in this area as well. It is therefore both essential and desirable that a boundary be found. From experience, imprecise boundaries lead to conflict, even though they are not always dramatic. The conflicts have a tendency to escalate in direct proportion to the value of the matter in dispute.

Both Tresselt and Rubakov are legal experts, and the discussions are still proceeding on legal bases. But even though it is clear that Norway is deemed to have a standpoint in accordance with international law, a political solution to the entanglement must be found. This is to say that both parties must straighten themselves out in regard to their principles.

It seems as though the Soviets are, as yet, unwilling to make this reconciliation. The "special circumstances" which are invoked for a sector-line are the same. The Kola Peninsula has a larger population than northern Norway, the sector-line has been cited as the boundary for the Soviet's "polar possession" since 1926, and the Soviets have greater strategic interests in the northern regions than Norway.

These arguments are rejected by the Norwegian side. They are not "special" enough to justify deviation from the mid-line principle.

Norway has previously signalled its willingness to compromise in order to reach the necessary political solution. Moscow has not come that far. The accuracy of that is nothing to be surprised over. The Soviets have always had as a principle to negotiate long and hard over problems of dissimilar types. Round Number 8--the date for which is not yet set--is going to be rather like Round Number 7.

12578

CSO: 3639/56

END

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

27 FEB. 1984